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NOTES
SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE FORUM: BRIDGING THE GAP
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW
Carl N. Pickerill*
INTRODUCTION
What if antitrust litigants could, instead of litigating their cases
before federal courts of limited expertise, litigate them before a hall-
of-fame antitrust panel composed of Richard Posner,' Robert Pitov-
sky,2 and Herbert Hovenkamp? 3 What if, instead of plaintiffs relying
on lay juries for an answer about whether they were harmed in a mass
toxic tort case, the plaintiffs could rely on the word of the best scien-
tists in the field? What if aggrieved shareholders, instead of bringing
their derivative lawsuits before an attorney-gamesmanship-susceptible
mishmash of juries and judges, could turn to an expert tribunal of
economists and brokers? These kinds of trials seem as desirable in
theory as they are impossible in practice. Or are they?
Countless scholars have noted the ascension of alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR) in the modern legal world as a way to achieve
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A. Sociology,
University of Chicago, 2005. Many thanks to Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his guidance
and suggestions throughout the writing and researching of this Note. I owe a debt of
gratitude as well to Executive Notes Editor G. David Mathues for the fruitful
discussion of note topics with him over the summer and throughout the year. And I
would like to thank the entire Law Review staff for their substantive and editing
contributions to the Note. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife Emily for
the support she has given me throughout law school,
1 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw (2d ed. 2001).
2 See ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION (5th ed. 2003).
3 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST (4th ed. 2005).
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such specialized adjudication. 4 ADR's obvious benefits-efficiency,
adjudication by an expert, and cost-effectiveness-have buoyed its use.
Yet other scholars decry it a thing that undermines the traditionally
judge-driven development of the common law.5 Arbitration's inability
to create precedent and its inconsistent results makes some question
its legitimacy. 6 On the other hand, practitioners, corporations, and
some legal scholars remain suspicious ofjudges' and juries' abilities to
"get it right" in highly technical cases. 7 Additionally, the docket bur-
den on federal courts ensures a lengthy trial process, especially for
technical cases, further encouraging litigants to choose arbitration."
4 Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have We Found a Better Way?,
18 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93, 108-14 (2002) (discussing the effectiveness of and
public satisfaction and dissatisfaction with ADR); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (disparaging the rise in arbitrated settlements between
otherwise litigious parties); Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory
of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civilfustice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949, 952 (2000)
(noting the "arrival of alternative dispute resolution.., onto the modem legal land-
scape"). One recent study, however, disputes the very "ascension" of ADR that so
many other scholars both revere and decry. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante Arbitration Clauses in
Publicly-Held Companies' Contracts 2, 19, 21 (Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper
Series No. 06-023, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=927423 (finding that
of 2,800 contracts filed by publicly-held companies with the SEC, only eleven percent
contained arbitration clauses; pooling servicing agreements and trust agreements
almost never included arbitration agreements, while employment agreements (thirty-
seven percent] and licensing agreements (forty-eight percent] had a somewhat
higher incidence of arbitration clauses).
5 Compare Tom Arnold, Why ADR, 619 PLI/PAT 1031, 1043-54 (2000) (noting
the benefits of ADR in litigation involving complex matters), with Rex R.
Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1, 13-15 (2004)
(arguing that both legislatively and judicially created legal rules have a prescriptive
role and that arbitrations and settlements result in fewer decided cases and an erosion
of legal precedent).
6 See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 4, at 983-85 ("ADR has not yet earned its legiti-
macy as a fair and impartial means of dispute resolution .... CT] here are fewer rules
to define the terms of the debate. .. ").
7 See Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199, 205-06 (1976) (decrying the gamesmanship and the nuisance of
settlements that often drive litigants away from the courtroom into arbitration).
8 See Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96,
99-100 (1976); see also Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience: The Problem of Federal
Appellate Courts, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 109-27 (2006) (arguing that the current
Supreme Court and federal appellate courts have created an untenable situation for
district courts by expanding jurisdiction while limiting trial judge discretion). Sherry
argues quite persuasively that the Supreme Court and appellate courts have expanded
federal jurisdiction through abrogation of state sovereign immunity and loosening of
supplemental jurisdiction, standing, and federal court intervention rules, while strip-
ping trial court judges of discretion not to hear certain state claims. Id. 109-23.
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What is the solution to the discontent inherent in both private
and public adjudication? 9 Private ADR cannot provide the solution
because it guts public common law. Public law cannot provide the
solution because of its lack of expertise, costs, and inefficiencies.
Instead, Congress should create a hybrid system similar to modern
administrative courts. 10 Such a system should be, and could be, a
streamlined, constitutionally-acceptable process where panels of
After enunciating an Eleventh Amendment state sovereign immunity doctrine in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court proceeded to abrogate that
immunity in a trio of cases. See Sherry, supra, at 111-13 (discussing Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990, 994 (2006) (holding that states do not have
immunity from bankruptcy proceedings), Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 530-34
(2004) (upholding the Americans with Disabilities Act, banning disability discrimina-
tion in public accommodations), Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721, 728-40 (2003) (upholding Congress's enactment of the Family Medical
Leave Act, requiring state employers to provide unpaid leave for employees caring for
an ill family member)). Likewise, the Court backed away from its holding in Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 817 (1986) (requiring a federal
cause of action for federal question jurisdiction), by ruling in Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing, 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005), that a
state cause of action raising a federal issue may be subject to federal jurisdiction. See
Sherry, supra, at 115-16. Simultaneously, many appellate courts have interpreted the
federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000), to limit trial judge
discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. See Sherry, supra, at 125. The result
has been to burden federal dockets with cases, in which disputing jurisdiction has
become the main event. This fact, along with the highly technical nature of business
litigation, helps explain why so many of these cases eventually find their way into
arbitration and other forms of ADR.
9 Obviously there is no one solution to the "discontent." For a discussion of
other proposed solutions to the private-public law divide see infra note 11 and accom-
panying text
10 Some have opined that legislative courts and administrative courts are distinct.
See Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 360
(1991) (advocating for a specialized court to review administrative agency action). I
concur with that statement; it is well established that the Tax Court-an Article I
legislative court-operates differently from an administrative law court. Compare 26
U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7453 (2000) (establishing the Tax Court and providing for use of
Federal Rules of Evidence), and TAX CT. R. PRAc. & P. 1 (a) (permitting rulemaking
through notice and comment to the public only for Tax Court procedure), with 5
U.S.C. §§ 553-557 (2000) (permitting liberal use of evidence rules; permitting agency
rulemaking and adjudication affecting both substantive and procedural rights). How-
ever, because this Note asks whether Congress can and should legislate a hybrid spe-
cialty court system, and because both Tax Courts and administrative courts are-
strictly speaking-legislated entities, I will treat both the same and focus exclusively on
the operation of administrative courts.
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experts in administrative agencies serve as factfinders in their respec-
tive fields.II
The goal is some middle ground between generalist renaissance
judges and institutionally illegitimate arbitrators and the hope is that
our aforementioned antitrust dream team and similar expert panels
would ultimately occupy that middle ground. However, an additional
hope is that this antitrust dream team would not only serve ADR par-
11 Administrative courts are not the only solution to the public court/private
court dichotomy. Other solutions propose: 1) using specialized state business courts,
similar to the Delaware Court of Chancery; 2) combining the systems of ADR and
public law; and 3) creating a national expert appeals court to hear claims directly
from administrative agencies. For a discussion proposing the use of specialized state
courts see Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DA E L. REv. 513, 580
(2006) (suggesting that a merger of traditional and alternative forums of adjudication
could take the form of "specialized courts, akin to Delaware's Chancery Court"); see
also DEL. CONsT. art. IV, § 10 (establishing the Delaware Court of Chancery to hear
cases arising under the laws of incorporation). The Chancery Court in particular and
specialized business courts in general have received much attention due to their capa-
bility of providing expert adjudicators in complex cases. See Rochelle C. Dreyfuss,
Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61
BRooK. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995) (comparing Delaware's Court of Chancery to other
specialized business tribunals and noting a "trend toward adjudicating business dis-
putes in a specialized tribunal"). But see Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REv. 679, 725-26 (2002) (arguing that
political realities prevent state legislators from establishing business courts and a rule-
based business code that would allow them to compete with Delaware for incorpora-
tions and also noting the relative ease in establishing such courts). The point of con-
tention surrounding specialized state courts would be Congress's power to not only
strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over certain specialized cases, but to mandate
the creation of specialized courts at the state level. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of
Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARv. L. REV.
1362, 1363-66 (1953); see also AnthonyJ. Bellia,Jr., Congressional Power and State Court
Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 950-51 (2006) (looking at federal regulation of state
court jurisdiction and showing that under Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947),
Congress can force states to enforce a federal action if it has "jurisdiction adequate
and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate [the] action" (citing id. at
394)). For a discussion proposing a "unification" of ADR and public courts by import-
ing more procedural safeguards and reasoned opinions into arbitration see Reuben,
supra note 4, at 1046-86 (suggesting a unification of "trial and some of what is now
called private ADR into a single system of interrelated dispute resolution processes...
preserv[ing] the virtues of the various ADR processes while acknowledging their mini-
mal but meaningful constitutional limits"). For a discussion of national expert
appeals court proposals see Bruff, supra note 10, at 360 (arguing for "a semi-special-
ized legislative court sitting nationwide to review both high-volume, fact-intensive
agency adjudications, and some other programs that . . . need specialization") and
Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA.
L. Riv. 1111, 1115, 1166-67 (1990) (arguing for "review of administrative action in
specialized courts" and that such courts should also possess fact-finding functions).
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ticipants by offering expert adjudication, but would also serve the pub-
lic by developing the common law by providing a source of reasoned
opinions and consistent results that current ADR does not provide.
Part I looks more closely at the criticisms leveled at both public
and private adjudication; by seeing the problems in each system we
can better see what we need in a new system of administrative courts.
Parts II through IV are organized in accordance with the most impor-
tant principles that this system must vindicate: Part II considers the
principles of institutional legitimacy and precedential value that schol-
ars claim is lacking from private ADR; Part III looks at the principles
of efficiency and expertise that other scholars claim is lacking from
public courts; Part IV looks at principles of constitutionality-Article
III restrictions and the Seventh Amendment.12 The conclusion will
propose a system of specialized administrative courts in specialized
fields having all the desirable attributes of current forums of adjudica-
tion (legitimacy, precedent, expertise, and efficiency), avoiding their
undesirable attributes (inconsistency, illegitimacy, cost, nonexper-
tise), and conforming with constitutional standards.
I. INSUFFICIENT AND UNSATISFYING: GRIPES ABOUT
CURRENT FORMS OF ADJUDICATION
A. Complaints About the Judicial System
Dissatisfaction with the federal judiciary is hardly a new phenom-
enon.," Adjudication by nature lends itself to the resolution of indi-
vidual problems and individual disputes. Consequently, no individual
litigant is willing to compromise the thoroughness of procedure in the
name of efficiency. However, litigants also have an interest in resolv-
ing their disputes expeditiously. So while they may demand a process
that strives to get things right on the merits, other concerns prevail.
One of those is efficiency.
12 See infra Part IV.
13 Many of the procedural alterations to federal adjudication owe their develop-
ment to criticism that Roscoe Pound leveled at the federal courts at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Although his criticisms-which decried the courts' slavish
adherence to procedural technicality over substance-find only marginal comparison
with the criticisms made by ADR proponents today, they compose part of a general
discontent with the federal judiciary. See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatis-
faction with the Administration of Justice, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395, 414 (1906), reprinted in 35
F.R.D. 273, 289 (1964) (bemoaning the time wasted and justice undelivered by virtue
ofjudges' insistence upon technical and procedural purity). For a comparison of the
challenges that faced Pound's legal world and the structural instabilities of our pre-
sent system of adjudication, see Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 513-17.
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just over thirty years ago, the Judicial Conference of the United
States addressed multiple concerns confronting the federal judiciary,
including its inefficiencies.1 4 Their conference, whose title-"Causes
of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice" (com-
monly known as the Pound Conference)-echoed the turn-of-the-cen-
tury complaints of Roscoe Pound, provided a blueprint for reforming
the judiciary by supplementing it with ADR. In his keynote address,
then ChiefJustice Warren Burger spoke of "the design of some new-
even radically new-'vehicles' to take [the judiciary] where [it]
want[ed] to go in the years ahead."15 Burger's comments, which fore-
casted the soon-to-follow ADR explosion, read more like an admoni-
tion than a well-defined proposal for new organizational legislation.
Their instructive value, however, lies in their suggestions for change.
Burger's demands stem mainly from a concern with efficiency. His
outline of the "most satisfactory, the speediest and the least expensive
means" 16 of adjudication included proposals for: flexible and informal
small claims courts; 17 "well-developed forms of arbitration;"18 and
forums where personal injury cases don't "take years to complete."19
Although Burger didn't couch his demands in the most eloquent
of prose, adherents to his ideas were no less vocal. Other speakers at
the conference blamed judicial ineffectiveness, backlogged dockets,
and pre-trial discovery for the courts' inefficiencies. 20 One speaker
satirized the plight of judges, who, unable to examine the "million [s]
of documents" that crop up during discovery, ultimately decide to
"giv[e] plaintiffs access to all of defendant's files and records, relevant
and irrelevant." 2' Aside from constituting a blatant invasion of pri-
vacy, such a description raises the specter of cases unresolved for years
and provides impetus for turning away from the courts.
14 Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dis-
satisfaction with the Administration of Justice, in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976) [hereinafter
Pound Conference].
15 Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Keynote Address at the National Conference
on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of justice: Agenda
for 2000 A.D.-Need for Systematic Anticipation (Apr. 7, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 85
(1976).
16 Id. at 93.
17 Id. at 94; cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("These rules .... shall be construed and adminis-
tered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.").
18 Burger, supra note 15, at 94.
19 Id. at 95.
20 See Kirkham, supra note 7, at 203; Rifkind, supra note 8, at 99-100.
21 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 203.
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The strongest critics at the 1976 Pound Conference harped upon
the federal judiciary's inability to handle complex cases. 22 The parade
of horribles trotted before the Conference included a case involving
hundreds of witnesses,2 3 a case where a jury sat for eleven months24
and cases involving dozens of lawyers and dozens of defendants. 25 A
simple Westlaw search according to firm or attorney demonstrates
that such convoluted arrangements are hardly the exception.2 6 Most
notable among these criticisms of federal adjudication, however, were
criticisms of the way the public seemed to view judges as omniscient
and of the inability of juries to comprehend legal issues in civil litiga-
tion.27 The critics doubted not only a 'jack[]-of-all trades"28 judge's
ability to provide solutions to every legal problem, but judges' abilities
to even explain such complex legal matters to juries who lacked the
"interest or attention necessary" to understand them.2 9
22 Id. at 208; Rifkind, supra note 8, at 103-04.
23 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 108 (citing United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) in which the "government announced it would call 100 witnesses, and IBM said
it would call 400" in a trial that the judge promised would take one year to try and one
year to decide).
24 Id. at 108 (citing United States v. Dardi, 330 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1963)). The
author cynically asked whether such process actually "constitute[d) a trial." Id.
25 Id. at 108 n.13 (citing United States v. Ark. Fuel Oil Corp., 1960 Trade Gas.
(CCH) 69,619 (N.D. Okla. 1960) (involving a case in which 84 lawyers represented
the defendant)); see also United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(commencing upon a complaint which named 63 defendants).
26 For example, a Westlaw search conducted on December 1, 2006 in the "All
Federal Cases" database (ALLFEDS) using the terms "at(Skadden & Kirkland &
Sidley)" yielded seven results. The first result was Pinney v. Nokia, Inc., 402 F.3d 430
(4th Cir. 2005), a case in which eighteen plaintiffs and fifty-three defendants were
represented by fifty-one lawyers in a tort action involving telephone radio transmis-
sions. The second result, Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir.
2001), while having only ten litigants, featured fifty lawyers in a health care fraud case.
This is not meant to be scientific; it serves only as an illustration of the complexity of
the cases and the extensive participation of the litigants.
27 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 208.
28 Rifkind, supra note 8, at 98; see also id. at 110 (stating that the complexity of
such fields of law as antitrust and securities overburdens the courts, whose subsequent
inconsistent decisions "make[] the law less certain" and "lessen[] respect for both the
courts and the law").
29 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 208; see also id. at 200-01 (expressing fear of judicial
and jury determination of "suit[s] affecting millions of stockholders, hundreds of
thousands of employees, pension and trust funds, banks and lending institutions,"
and suggesting that courts' interpretations of an "unreasonable restraint of trade" for
purposes of the Sherman Act would be akin to a legislature's interpretation of the
Due Process Clause).
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The Pound Conference's criticisms and Burger's suggested solu-
tions have found reception both among judges and-perhaps more
obviously-among legal practitioners. Practitioners and litigants have
deserted the federal courts for private litigation in ever increasing
numbers.3 0 In addition, both Congress and the federal judiciary itself
have taken Burger's admonitions to heart. Congress passed the Civil
Justice Reform Act (CJRA) 31 in 1990, requiring five experimental dis-
trict courts to adopt ADR methods to "reduc[e] cost and delay in civil
litigation."32 After the CJRA was allowed to sunset in 1997, Congress
enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) 33 in 1998,
requiring every federal district court to make ADR available to
litigants.3 4
Likewise, the federal judiciary has renewed its concerns with over-
loaded dockets and inefficiency expressed at the Pound Conference.
Notions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness underlay the Judicial Con-
ference's Long Range Plan of 1995, which "encourage[d] each fed-
eral court to expand the scope and availability of alternative methods
of dispute resolution," noting the difficulty of "receiv[ing] early and
firm trial dates."3 -'
The Plan's concern with efficiency goals translated into a series of
110 recommendations and 77 suggested implementation strategies. 6
Although the Long Range Plan generally advised Congress not to
enlarge federal jurisdiction, one specific recommendation hinted at
30 Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADt9 59
ALE. L. Rxv. 847, 848-58 (2004) (tracing the expanded use of ADR in the business
world); Alan W. Kowalchyk, Resolving Intellectual Property Disputes Outside of Court: Using
ADR to Take Control of Your Case, 61 Disp. RESOL. J., May-July 2006, at 28, 30 (noting the
attraction of using ADR to resolve intellectual property disputes because it is "less
costly and faster ... less formal than litigation, it allows for less discovery, judicial
rules of evidence do not apply"); Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite": Procedural
and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289,
1300-01 (1998) (surveying the vast possibilities for ADR forums, including a litany of
special court-annexed ADR codifications for disputes involving forestry practices, pub-
lic school bus routes, surface water rights, and earthquake insurance, among other
things). But see Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 4, at 2, 19-21 (arguing that litigants in
certain fields have begun to shun ADR).
31 Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000)).
32 Id. § 104(b) (2), 104 Stat. at 5097.
33 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
102 Stat. 4659 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000)).
34 Id.
35 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS
134 (1995) [hereinafter CONF. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING].
36 Id. at 21-144.
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another potential source of dissatisfaction among litigants: judicial
expertise. 37
Criticisms of the absence of judicial expertise have produced pre-
dictable results. Increasingly, for litigants who don't want to subject
themselves to the capriciousness of a sympathetic jury or nonexpert
judge, the allure of arbitration is too good to pass up.38 In forums
where "parties can select a decision maker with expertise"39 and avoid
"an unsophisticated, uninformed jury,"40 the risks of watching an
untrained or insufficiently attentive decisionmaker misconceive the
complex scientific or economic issues in one's case are reduced.
The sheer burden of these cases and the sheer volume of matters
tried and pending before the courts is also an area of concern for
litigants. In addition to the transactional costs that deter litigants
from entering the federal courts, judges' bursting dockets deter the
judges themselves from wanting to take additional cases. Both the
1976 Pound Conference and the 1995 Long Range Plan made over-
tures to the unwieldy state of federal dockets. While the 1976 Pound
Conference looked to ADR as the judiciary's savior, the Long Range
Plan admonished Congress to shrink jurisdiction, while continuing
Burger's call to increase the use of ADR. 41 Judith Resnik summarized
the consensus within the federal judiciary as follows: "Don't expand
the life-tenured ranks .... Rely ... on delegation . . .of non life-
tenured federal judges, as well as [on] devolution to the states or
retrenchment on access to federal courts ... 42
37 Id. at 109-10 (advocating for more extensive "education and training" for
judges and noting that the "[slocial, technological and demographic changes will
require a higher level of judicial competence").
38 See Ad Hoc Comm. on Bus. Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient
Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAw. 947, 947 (1997) (noting the concerns of the business and legal
community "regarding the efficiency, predictability, experience, and knowledge of
courts with respect to complex corporate and commercial disputes"); Cronin-Harris,
supra note 30, at 873.
39 Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30, 33 (noting that in some IP mediations, a team
of mediators may be used, each of whom possess expertise in the different issues that
arise in the mediation).
40 Arnold, supra note 5, at 1049 (describing judges as "the luck of the draw
among friends of Senators" who are "without sophisticated patent, technology, copy-
right and business experience and are overworked").
41 CONF. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, supra note 35, at 23-39.
42 Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative
Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEo. L.J. 2589, 2610 (1998). Resnik has also noted
Congress's enthusiasm for creating new substantive rights, which would seem to place
Congress's objectives in the area of federal causes of action in direct conflict with
both the objectives of the federal judiciary and the goals of the CJRA and the ADR
Act. SeeJudith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the Federal District
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There exists agreement among litigants, Congress, and the fed-
eral courts that something must be done about the unwieldy nature,
inefficiency, and nonexpertise of federal adjudication. Up until now,
the answer to that question has been to transfer decisionmaking
responsibilities to private arbitrators and mediators. While these
forums offer significant advantages-such as expertise and effi-
ciency-many commentators point out their drawbacks.
B. ADR and its Discontents
The inefficiencies and nonexpertise of the federal courts deter
litigants from using them to resolve their disputes. In recent years,
they have filled that void by turning to alternative forums. Private
ADR, although hardly novel,43 provides litigants with that alternative
forum.
ADR exists in a variety of forms. While in arbitrations a neutral
party selected by the litigants determines the legal issues in dispute,
mediation involves a neutral third party lacking the power to impose a
solution.44 Arbitrators can conduct the proceedings according to the
manner in which the litigants customize them. Correspondingly, the
arbitrations can be "less formal, faster, and less expensive than the
judicial process."45 Arbitrations can be either binding or nonbinding,
upon which the litigants must agree before hand.
Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607,
649 (2002) (noting the "474 new causes of action" created by Congress between 1974
and 1998). On the other hand, the current twenty-first century Supreme Court has
shown a willingness to expand federal jurisdiction while decreasing the discretion
exercised by district courtjudges. See Sherry, supra note 8, at 98, 127 (arguing that
appellate judges have ignored the rigors of trial court litigation in enunciating "fuzzy
rules on jurisdictional questions and clear rules limiting trial court discretion" which
has produced disputes over jurisdiction rather than the merits of cases).
43 See Sabatino, supra note 30, at 1297 ("Commercial arbitration has been prac-
ticed for centuries and statutorily authorized for decades." (footnote omitted)).
44 THOMAS D. ROWE, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 194-97 (2004) (citing LEONARD
RISKIN & JAMES E. WESTBROOK, DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LA:wYERS 2-6 (abr. 2d ed.
1998)).
45 Id. at 194. The verdict is still out on whether ADR truly is faster and less expen-
sive. Compare JAMES S. KAALiR ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEU-
TRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE CML JUSTICE REFORM ACT 4 (1996) (finding "no strong
statistical evidence that time to disposition, litigation costs, or... satisfaction with case
management were significantly affected, either positively or negatively" by the use of
ADR), with DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT TO THEJUDICIAL CON-
FERENCE COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 215 (1997)
(finding a twenty-eight percent improvement on the median age of cases at termina-
tion for cases in the Western District of Missouri required to participate in an ADR
program, compared with those not permitted to participate).
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Mediation consists only of negotiations in which a mediator seeks
to reach a result suitable to both parties. 46 Other forms of ADR com-
bine arbitration and mediation in different ways, again, according to
prior agreement by the litigants. Mini-trials and summary jury trials
allow attorneys to present their cases before an advisory group, and in
some cases ajury, who then provide feedback on the relative merits of
each case.47 One further variant is early neutral evaluation where a neu-
tral party identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the litigants' cases
in an effort to compel settlement.48 Furthermore, Rule 68 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure permits defendants to tender offers of
settlement to plaintiffs before trial. 49
Congress has also helped shape ADR, enacting two statutes to
promote its use.50 The first-the aforementioned CJRA 51-required
certain pilot federal districts to refer "appropriate cases to [ADRI pro-
grams" and offer nonbinding early neutral evaluation programs where
litigants present their cases to a neutral party.52 It involved a limited
number of federal district courts for a limited number of years. The
second-the aforementioned ADR Act,53 which essentially replaced
the CJRA after it expired in 1997-requires every federal district to
implement an ADR plan for use in all civil actions.5 4 District judges
may refer cases to arbitration, where decisions are then entered as the
judgment of the court if a party to the arbitration fails to file a written
demand for a trial de novo following the arbitration. 55
Litigants bear the costs of the arbitrator. Although ADR propo-
nents argue that these costs are more than offset by the brevity of the
proceedings, 56 ADR's detractors cite the exorbitant fees that arbitra-
46 KAKALIK ET AL., SUpra note 45, at 196.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 FED. R. Crv. P. 68.
50 Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000). The
CJRA, although technically still on the books, was allowed to sunset in 1997. The
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (ADR Act) of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (2000),
quickly took its place, however, requiring "[e] ach ... district court [to] authorize...
the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in all civil actions." Id. § 651(b).
51 See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Civil
Justice Reform Act in its historical context.
52 KAKALiK ET AL., supra note 45, at 2 (citing Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 473(a), (b)).
53 See supra note 31-34 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the Alter-
native Dispute Resolution Act in its historical context.
54 28 U.S.C. § 651(b).
55 Id. §§ 657(a), (c).
56 Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30.
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tors charge, 7 bemoaning the development of a system 
of "second
class justice" in which "the better-off can avoid [courts] by buying
their way into the litigation counterpart 
of a gated community.
' 58
Its proponents recognize this opposition. Judge 
Wayne Brazil,
for example, acknowledged both the "second 
class justice" concern
and the concern about falling rates of cases 
that are actually termi-
nated during or after a trial.
59 Although Brazil advocates adding ADR
services to the federal courts, he cautions against 
"assess[ing] ADR
program value with myopic self-congratulation"; 
he cites reports in
the Northern District of California showing 
that while 47% of
mediators believed the effectiveness of ADR 
processes, only 22% of
parties felt similarly.
60
ADR's critics are even more scathing. Most bemoan 
not only its
ineffectiveness, but its tendency to remove important 
cases from fed-
eral jurisdiction. Professor Owen Fiss's 1984 article, for 
example,
claimed that encouraging settlement served only 
to avoid controversy,
which correspondingly avoided resolution of 
cases important to soci-
ety.6' Other commentators claim that contractually-compelled 
arbi-
tration will soon place particular types of cases-like 
consumer class
actions-outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
62 And still
others say that taking such cases outside of federal 
jurisdiction-while
bringing costly and protracted litigation to 
a resolution-doesn't
57 In reAtlantic Pipe Corp., 304 F.3d 135, 144 
(1st Cir. 2002).
58 RowE ET AL., supra note 44, at 215.
59 Brazil, supra note 4, at 125 (citing a study finding 
that the percentage of cases
terminated during or after trial decreased from 
4.3% to 2.2% of all civil case termina-
tions between 1990 and 2000).
60 Id. at 146-47.
61 Fiss, supra note 4, at 1076. Fiss illustrates 
quite vividly the societal import of
such issues by distinguishing uncontroversial 
cases involving corporate litigants of
equal bargaining strength with scenarios such 
as "a struggle between a member of a
racial minority and a municipal police department 
over alleged brutality, or a claim
by a worker against a large corporation over work-related 
injuries." Id.
62 Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, 
Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MtcH. L. REv. 373, 375-76 
(2005) (arguing that the rise in use
of contractual class action waivers prevents 
consumer class actions not only in the
federal courts, but in arbitrations as well); see also Carnival Cruise 
Lines, Inc. v. Shute,
499 U.S. 585, 593-94 (1991) (holding valid and binding 
a forum clause placed on
already-purchased tickets, and finding consent 
to the clause despite plaintiffs' inabil-
ity to view the tickets until after the purchase 
had been made). Presumably, after
Carnival Cruise, a defendant seller could always 
compel arbitration or a class action
waiver by including one with the purchased product, 
and as Gilles points out, "it will
become malpractice for corporate counsel 
not to include such clauses." Gilles, supra,
at 377 (emphasis added).
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ensure that arbitrators have adhered to legal standards or that the
public interest has been served.
63
Finally, one of the greatest concerns over the increased use of
ADR is its tendency to undermine further development of the law.
ADR proponent Judge Brazil acknowledged certain judges' fear that
"ADR may be used to reduce the opportunities the courts and the
public have to develop new legal norms."64 Professor Fiss put it in
somewhat starker terms, claiming that settlements "deprive .
court[s] of ... the ability to render an interpretation .... To settle
for something means to accept less than some ideal. ' 6 5 In other
words, arbitrators have effectively become the interpreters of law,
while judges have devolved to a last resort: If things go really poorly,
we'll let the courts step in; otherwise the arbitrator's word is final.
In a more recent criticism of ADR, Professors Perschbacher and
Bassett argued that ADR suspends the growth of legal precedent.66
They argue that fewer decided cases result in a body of law with "far
fewer formal, publicly announced decisions applying rules and stan-
dards" which in turn "distort[s] the law, because [ADR] ... do[es] not
constitute legal precedent."67 Correspondingly, the opportunities for
a judge to apply a statute or legal standard to new sets of facts are
reduced, while non precedential arbitration decisions, over which the
courts don't always exercise oversight, take their place. The law
thereby sacrifices its predictability and uniformity in the name of
efficiency.
Ultimately, ADR's dissimilar treatment of similar factual scena-
rios, inconsistent conclusions, preclusion of the adjudication of
important cases, and neglect of judge-made common law, demand a
solution. Much like the manner in which the dual systems of common
law and equity eventually found a common ground, so must ADR and
traditional adjudication bridge the gaps between them.6
In light of this, one commentator has argued that certain proce-
dural gaps have effectively already been bridged. 69 Others argue that
63 Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema , 99 HAv.
L. REV. 668, 677-78 (1986) (giving environmental law and family law cases as exam-
ples that do not belong in arbitration or mediation).
64 Brazil, supra note 4, at 125.
65 Fiss, supra note 4, at 1085-86.
66 Perschbacher & Bassett, supra note 5, at 19-22.
67 Id. at 27.
68 Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 576-77 (arguing generally for a "new merger"
between "our present legal procedure with the 'new equity'"-alternative dispute
resolution).
69 Sabatino, supra note 30, at 1295 (arguing that certain procedural norms such
as notice, discovery, partisan submissions, and subpoenas emerge in ADR).
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ADR must incorporate even more procedural norms 
to make the two
systems compatible, while still others argue that court-annexed 
ADR is
in fact public and thus amenable to 
due process restrictions.
70
Scholarly proposals to bridge the gap between public 
and private
adjudication are as numerous as scholarly criticisms against 
public and
private adjudication. But rather than merging two somewhat 
incom-
patible systems, why not create new forums 
within already existing
administrative agency infrastructure to absorb 
the excesses of both?
The creators of administrative agencies fashioned 
them as disinter-
ested experts capable of resolving the complexities 
of the modern
age. 71 Why not use their expertise in the adjudication of today's 
most
complex and docket-consuming litigation?
The intellectual foundation for such an infrastructure 
would arise
from case management, a phenomenon that 
grew out of the 1983
amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.
72
Case management's strongest-and most controversial-incarnation
has arguably been Judge Jack Weinstein, who 
orchestrated resolutions
to complex cases such as the Agent Orange and 
DES claims. 73 Wein-
stein's managerial activism prompted one 
writer to brand him a
"creat[or] of the 'temporary administrative agency' due to his expan-
sion of the court's reach in involving more "actors 
and institutions ...
in a given" litigation controversy.
74
The notion of the judge as an administrative agency evokes
images of the self-professedly disinterested and 
expert administrator
70 Reuben, supra note 4, at 954-55. Reuben 
also notes that arbitrators under cer-
tain arbitration rules issue written opinions to 
litigants. Id. at 1083-84. These opin-
ions do not serve as stare decisis precedent in 
future arbitrations, however. See Paul
R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 963, 983-87 (2005) (noting that
the Supreme Court regularly affirms arbitration 
decisions, despite potential Due Pro-
cess concerns and therefore arguing for more 
procedural safeguards to be imple-
mented through congressional enactment); supra note 
11 (discussing other solutions
to the private-public court divide).
71 SeeJAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCSS 22-27 (1938).
72 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's 
notes (1983 amend.) (requiring a
scheduling order and a final pre-trial conference 
prior to adjudication, effectively
granting a quasi-administrative role to judges in the litigation 
process).
73 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Reflections on judge Weinstein's 
Ethical Dilemmas in Mass
Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 569, 571 
(1994).
74 Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, 
Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. RPEv. 2010, 
2010-12 (1997). Interestingly, the
presenters at the 1976 Pound Conference would 
have undoubtedly abhorred such
judicial commandeering of a case. See Rifkind, supra note 
8, at 102 (cynically refer-
encing Judge Weinstein's "rewarding and 
self-fulfilling experience [in] writ[ing] a
prescription for the rehabilitation and pacification 
of a large strife-torn community"
in Hart v. Community School Board, 383 F. Supp. 
699, 733-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)).
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who issues regulations in his field of specialty unburdened by special
interest or political coercion.75 One commentator has run with that
evocation, claiming that in the mass tort context, administrative agen-
cies-with authority derived from Congress to "effect binding regula-
tion"-should act as facilitators of private agreements, rather than
relying upon docket-burdened judges like Jack Weinstein. 76 The
rationale is that agencies are sufficiently capable to balance the
numerous and competing interests often at stake in such complex
cases.
Parts II, III, and IV of this Note will sprint forward with that sug-
gestion, arguing that Congress can and should offer litigants an
expert and disinterested administrative alternative to both ADR and
the federal courts.
II. INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND PRECEDENTIAL VALUE
A. Why Does the Legal System Need Precedent?
Although the Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp antitrust dream team
panel mentioned in the Introduction would not be inconceivable in
an ADR setting, its opinions would not promote the development of
public law. This Part proposes that Congress's hybrid system of expert
adjudicators bestow upon the legal community the fruits of its exper-
tise by resolving legal disputes in public forums and issuing reasoned
opinions.
Of course, simply arguing for public resolution of disputes and
written opinions certainly begs the question: Why is the development
of law through institutional resolution of legal disputes important?
Many commentators would argue against it. One main purpose of
ADR, they say, is to insulate litigating parties from the public view. 77
Such a view is not without its critics, however, who argue that secrecy
not only advantages the more well-equipped party,78 but often allows
75 See LANis, supra note 71, at 28.
76 Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 899,
904 (1996).
77 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Demo-
cratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEo. LJ. 2663, 2683 (1995) (criticizing
those demanding a "full public airing of the fact-finding and discovery process" as too
focused "on the needs and interests of those other than the immediate parties to
[the] . . . dispute").
78 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1075 ("Consent is often coerced; the bargain may be
struck by someone without authority... justice may not be done.").
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But there exist still other reasons why a good adjudicatory system
should have both precedent and institutional 
legitimacy. First, publi-
cation of legal opinions from resolved cases provides 
the public with
notification of what the law is.
80 ADR, although it gives directives to
the parties involved, does not create any binding 
precedent upon
which later litigants can rely.
8 1 Second, development of the law
through judicial opinions provides a building of consensus 
on how a
particular (and oftentimes ambiguous) statute 
will be applied.8 2
79 See FRANK ELKOUI & EDNA A. ELKOURI, 
How ARBIrrRATION WoRiKs 586, 533-40
(Alan M. Ruben ed., 6th ed. 2003). "[While] [c]ourt decisions 
can influence an arbi-
trator's decision .... [i] n some instances .
. . arbitrators disagree with the decisions
handed down by courts and refuse to follow 
them." Id. at 538-40. Ultimately, the
rules an arbitrator follows are drafted "by the 
parties themselves.... As such, private-
sector parties are free to control the degree 
to which the arbitrator is to consider
external law, including statutes, and regulations, 
in deciding the case." Id. at 486
(footnote omitted).
80 See David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an 
American Community: Perspectives on a
Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 425, 
435-36 (contesting the assertion that
informal resolution of conflicts in society form 
"customary law" in the way that "cases
and controversies" form common law; asserting 
that "[flrom [eases and controver-
sies] emerge new law, new norms, and new relationships"); 
Jack B. Weinstein, Some
Benefits and Risks of Privatization offustice Through ADR, 11 OF1Ho 
ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL.
241, 249 ("For law to serve its function as giving expression 
to enforceable behavioral
norms, it must be made publicly for all to see .... 
Members of the public must know
what the law is . . . ").
81 See ELxouml & ELKOUI, supra note 79, at 
588-89, 596-98 (noting that arbitra-
tion decisions may preclude future arbitration 
through res judicata or collateral
estoppel, but that the persuasive weight of 
arbitration case law depends upon the
persuasive value that individual arbitrators choose 
to give it in individual arbitrations).
Additionally, the development of a unified 
body of arbitration case law depends
largely upon the arbitration decisions that actually 
make it to publication. See Reu-
ben, supra note 4, at 1083-87. Professor Reuben 
notes that different arbitration orga-
nizations have different rules regarding the 
publication of written opinions: Some
advocate for it, while most cite it as an invitation 
to judicial review. Reuben also notes
that in the labor arbitration context, "in which 
written and reasoned opinions have
been customary for years, only an estimated 
ten percent of the opinions issued are
actually published." Id.
82 Antitrust law presents perhaps the most 
salient example of an ambiguous stat-
ute, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. 
1V 2004). The Sherman Act
prohibits " [e]very contract, combination ... or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade." This
ambiguity has found some clarity through judicial interpretation. 
See, e.g., Bd. of
Trade of Chi. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 
239-41 (1918) (qualifying antitrust
prohibitions in allowing certain reasonable restraints 
designed to enhance competi-
tion); United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 
290, 351-55 (1897) (holding,
in one of the first antitrust cases, that combinations 
and contracts restricting trade
only collaterally to a sale might not be banned 
by the antitrust laws, but that others
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Third, judicial interpretation and publication of the law affords the
legal system flexibility in the event that perceptions of 
governing legal
norms change over time.
8 3 Fourth, publication of reasoned opinions
gives the public and politicians a chance not only to react, 
but to act
upon application of particular legal standards 
by changing them
through the legislative process.
8 4 Finally, and this is perhaps the point
made most often by ADR's critics, public scrutiny and 
resolution of
certain legal disputes forces society to confront certain 
problems that
might otherwise receive short shrift.
5
Administrative agencies can provide an alternative 
both to tradi-
tional forums for adjudication and forums of alternative dispute reso-
lution. On the one hand, administrative agencies 
and their courts
mimic many of the formalities of the courts, including 
application of
were); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
278-79 (1898), afrd, 175
U.S. 211 (1899) (reaffirming Trans-Missouri and holding that 
contracts void at com-
mon law had been made unlawful by the Sherman 
Act).
83 This is perhaps best reflected in those instances 
in which courts revisit old
opinions that are perhaps inapplicable or outdated 
for the present times. Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (permitting the execution 
of juveniles for capital
crimes), overruled by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-79 
(2005); Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537, 551-52 (1896) (public facilities may be racially separate 
but equal),
overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 
(1954); Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 1, 18-22 (1842) (effectively interpreting the Rules 
of Decision Act as a fed-
eral common law), overruled by Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)
("There is no federal general common law.").
84 This can be seen most vividly in response to 
the Supreme Court's constrover-
sial eminent domain decision in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 487-90 (2005)
(permitting city's exercise of its eminent domain powers for 
private economic devel-
opment as consistent with "public use" because it 
served a "public purpose"). Citizen
groups and state legislatures responded with petitions, 
bills and laws. See, e.g., S. 1313,
109th Cong. (2005) (proposing to limit federal use of eminent domain); 
H.R. 4128,
109th Cong. (2005) (same); H.R. 4091, 94th Gen. Assem., 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2005) (pro-
posing to limit the use of eminent domain); Letter from 
Douglas Adams McNea &
Karin Annette Hipona to Bill Locklyer, Attorney 
Gen., Cal. (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
www.limiteminentdomain-org (follow "Read the Initiative" hyperlink) 
(proposing bal-
lot initiative to limit use of eminent domain; failed 
to qualify for November, 2006
ballot). These Congressional responses to court decisions through 
the legislative pro-
cess are hardly unprecedented and hardly obscure. 
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV
(responding to Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404-06, 
411-14, 453-54 (1856)
(permitting states to define property as including African slaves 
and excluding Afri-
can slaves from the definition of "citizen" for purposes 
of the Constitution) by outlaw-
ing slavery); 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (responding to McNally 
v. United States, 483 U.S.
350, 360-61 & n.9 (1987) (excluding from the definition of 
"mail fraud" deprivation
by politicians of the public's "honest services") by outlawing 
the use of the mails or
wires to deprive another "of the intangible right of 
honest services").
85 See Fiss, supra note 4, at 1085-87 (advocating for the 
position that litigation
should seek "Justice Rather Than Peace"); supra text accompanying 
notes 61-63.
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all relevant legal authority; 6 on the other hand, agency adjudications
can progress more quickly than traditional trials due to the absence of
certain legal formalities.8 7 Additionally, they are conducted by admin-
istrative law judges (ALJs), who possess expertise in their field.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act's Default Rules
The Administrative Procedure Act establishes general rules for
agency action. The modes of agency action consist of two general
modes of rulemaking (informal and formal rulemaking), and two gen-
eral modes of adjudication (informal and formal adjudication).88 The
first, informal rulemaking-otherwise known as notice and comment
proceedings-permits agencies to adopt rules of governance by giving
written notice to affected persons of an agency's proposed rule and
permitting those persons to comment upon the proposed rule.89 The
agency must then take those comments into account in promulgating
a final rule constituting the agency's "basis and purpose" for the rule
adopted.90 The second, formal rulemaking, requires the agency to fol-
low an elaborate set of procedures before adopting a final rule, per-
mitting cross-examination, discovery, rules of evidence, etc. 91 The
86 Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency
Formal Adversarial Adjudications: A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 353, 360 (noting
that "ALJs hear arguments and consider evidence . .. (and] apply relevant statutes,
precedents, and agency regulations").
87 See infra Part III.
88 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTPATVE LAW 193-97 (4th ed. 2007).
89 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000).
90 Id. § 553(c); see, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35-36 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (requiring agencies to divulge the "thinking that has animated.., a pro-
posed rule and the data upon which that rule is based"); Auto. Parts & Accessories
Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (adding in dicta that the "'concise
general statement of ... basis and purpose' mandated by Section [553] will enable
[the reviewing court] to see what major issues of policy were ventilated by the infor-
mal proceedings"); see also LAWSON, supra note 88, at 243-52 (describing "hybrid APA
rulemaking," in which judges on the D.C. Circuit-the court in which the majority of
administrative appeals are heard-grafted additional procedural requirements onto
agency rulemaking). But see Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 545-46 (1978) (prohibiting appellate courts from review-
ing and overturning agency rulemaking proceedings on the basis of the procedural
devices employed). Vermont Yankee has been understood to apply only to the proceed-
ings themselves, and not to the additional requirements that courts may graft onto
the process of "notice and comment" or publication of a "basis and purpose." LAW-
SON, supra note 88, at 273-83.
91 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 556-557. The formal rulemaking procedures are listed in
§§ 556-557. Section 553 establishes that agencies must follow these procedures only
when the individual agency's organic statute calls for a hearing "on the record."
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third, informal adjudication imposes "essentially no procedural con-
straints" on the agency in deciding disputes arising between parties.92
Finally, formal adjudication imposes the entire panoply of procedures
on agency action between individual litigants.93 These procedures
include notice to the parties, discovery, cross examination, etc., but
are generally regarded as less restrictive than the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.9 4 Although Congress's hybrid system of administrative adjudi-
cation would use only the fourth method of agency action (i.e. formal
adjudication), agencies do possess wide discretion to use a combina-
tion of rulemaking and adjudication in resolving disputes.95
C. A Look at One Agency and How it Would be Imitated
The APA represents merely a default. Congress may impose addi-
tional rules on individual agencies in their enabling statutes. The
important point is that Congress can create an agency however it
wants with whatever procedures it wants, subject to constitutional
restraints. 96 Consequently, Congress could legislate a hybrid system of
expert administrative adjudication however it wants. To simplify
Although United States v. Florida East Coast Railway, 410 U.S. 224 (1973), did not
expressly state that "on the record" must appear in the agency statute, it has been
interpreted to have so held. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d
1238, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
92 LAWSON, supra note 88, at 323. But see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park v. Volpe,
401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (holding that section 706 of the APA-providing for de
novo review of agency action-requires agencies to produce "the full administrative
record that was before the [agency]" when it made its decision). Courts may not,
however, dictate to the agencies what the record contains or how they go about pro-
ducing it. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV, Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 653-54 (1990).
93 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557. These procedures consist of cross examinations,
subpoenas, depositions, conferences for settlement, alternative dispute resolution,
findings and conclusions of law and fact, etc.
94 See Graham, supra note 86, at 382 (arguing that agencies should import eviden-
tiary standards into formal adjudication). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (permitting an
adjudicating agency discretion to receive "[alny oral or documentary evidence" and
to exclude "irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence"), with FED. R. EVID.
802 (excluding hearsay evidence from federal trials).
95 M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 1383,
1409 (2004) (noting that agencies possess wide discretion over the form in which they
choose to act, subject to the agency's own statute, which may limit agency action to
rulemaking, adjudication, or not at all); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
209 (1947) (permitting the SEC to retroactively prohibit holding company managers
from purchasing the company's preferred stock during company reorganization in an
adjudication, rather than issuing a general rule through notice-and-comment
proceedings).
96 See infra Part IV.
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things, I will focus on one agency-the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) 9 7 -whose formal adjudicatory structure demon-
strates the efficiency, expertise, and legitimacy that the hybrid adjudi-
catory system must have. A system structured similarly to the CFTC
could realize some of the attributes that neither public nor private law
possesses.
The CFTC has authority to implement the Commodity Exchange
Act (CEA), 9s which, among other things, permits disgruntled custom-
ers of professional commodity brokers to bring causes of action
against brokers for violations of the CEA.99 One could easily imagine
such a provision in the SEC Act or the FTC Act, where, for example,
antitrust litigants could have their cases heard before our dream team
Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp panel, or a panel of similar expertise but
lesser renown.
Within the CFTC, litigants bring their claims before an ALJ, who
follows the procedural restraints of agency regulations and the APA in
reaching a decision. 100 The litigants bring the claims and the ALJ
resolves the claims in a formal adjudication. Furthermore, ALJ resolu-
tion culminates in a reasoned opinion following established statutory,
judicial and agency precedent. Whether that opinion binds future
agency adjudications as a stare decisis-type precedent has been a sub-
ject of controversy; the controversy has largely found resolution in the
affirmative, albeit not without some disagreement.""1 Even without
97 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 7 U.S.C. §§ 18(a),
(b) (2000) (granting the CFTC jurisdiction to hear claims brought by persons com-
plaining of violation of provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation, or order issued
pursuant to the Act and also granting CFTC the authority to issue rules "necessary or
appropriate for the efficient and expeditious administration" of the Act).
98 Commodity Exchange Act §§ 1, 8a, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1, 12a(5). (2000) (authorizing
the CFTC to issue regulations carrying out the provisions of the Act).
99 Id.; see Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53
(1986). Schor held constitutional the CFTC's promulgation of a regulation-17
C.F.R. § 12.23(b) (2) (2006)-that permitted it to exercise common law counterclaim
jurisdiction over claims arising out of transactions complained of under section 18(a).
See infra Part IV.
100 See 17 C.F.R. § 12.13(b) (2006) (permitting parties to proceed with their
claims through formal adjudication if the amount in dispute is greater than $30,000);
id. §§ 12.300-.400 (providing for a formal hearing before an ALJ including opportu-
nity for cross and direct examination, presentation of documents, subpoena power,
etc.); see also 5 U.S.C. § 556 (2000) (establishing general standards for formal adminis-
trative agency adjudications).
101 Richard Murphy has analyzed the Supreme Court's intricate balancing act
between agency precedent on the one hand, and judicial deference to the agencies'
decisions to change their minds on the other. See Richard W. Murphy, Judicial Defer-
ence, Agency Commitment, and Force of Law, 66 OHio ST. L.J. 1013 (2005). Early courts
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such an affirmation, however, Congress could stipulate 
that ALJ deci-
sions serve as precedent by stipulating in the agency's 
enabling statute
that prior adjudications will either bind through stare decisis 
or at
least serve as highly persuasive precedent 
in future adjudications 02
And in fact, many agencies that act principally 
through adjudication
reviewing agency actions required agencies 
to adhere to established agency prece-
dent. See United States v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 
278 U.S. 269, 280 (1929) (if an agency
"interpretation has not been uniform, it is not 
entitled to. .. respect or weight"). The
Court shifted gears in 1984, however, deciding 
that agencies are best positioned to
interpret their statutory mandates, and upholding 
an agency action "if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific 
issue," and the interpretation "is based
on a permissible construction of the statute." 
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The natural 
corollary to Chevron
would seem to be that agencies are free to interpret 
their regulations in one way one
day and another way the next. The Court, however, 
has made two recent attempts to
ensure more adherence to agency precedent. United 
States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that courts defer to agency 
actions only where "Congress
delegated authority to the agency . . to 
make rules carrying the force of law, and ...
the agency interpretation . . . was . .. 
in the exercise of that authority" (emphasis
added)); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 
586-87 (2000) (holding that
agency opinion letters interpreting agency regulations 
and statutes-in contrast to
formal adjudications-"lack the force of law" and are not entitled 
to Chevron deference
(emphasis added)). Additionally, courts should look to 
agency consistency in deter-
mining a measure of deference. Id. The Court 
in Mead and Christensen held that
when confronted with mere opinion letters or 
statements of policy that interpret stat-
utes, courts should apply Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 
134, 140 (1944) (holding
that deference to the agency "depend [s] upon ... all those 
factors which give it power
to persuade"), and its style of deference instead of Chevron 
deference. Mead, 533 U.S.
at 219; Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587. Although 
this ensures that agencies will adhere to
precedent when promulgating opinion letters 
and statements of policy (interpreta-
tions "lacking the force of law"), Murphy feels that agencies 
have free reign to aban-
don past precedent when they see fit. Murphy, 
supra, at 1022 ("Chevron.. suggested
that agency consistency should have little bearing 
on deference."). Murphy proposes
instead a "commitment theory" in which agency 
interpretations-including orders
issued in formal adjudication-would receive deference only 
if consistent with prior
agency interpretations. Id. at 1071-72. In reality, 
his fears may be a bit overblown. In
addition to the APA, which prohibits agency action 
that is "arbitrary, capricious, [or]
an abuse of discretion," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000), the 
D.C. Circuit-a leading
voice on administrative law-has said that an 
agency "cannot ignore its own relevant
precedent but must explain why it is not controlling." 
LeMoyne-Owen Coll. v. NLRB,
357 F.3d 55, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing BB & L, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 52 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)) (reversing NLRB determination that faculty 
members were not manage-
ment for purposes of collective bargaining 
because of contradiction with prior
precedent).
102 See LAwsON, supra note 88, at 197 ("[ 1 rganic statutes... 
empower and limit
the agency in question.").
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operate in this manner.
10 3 In such agencies, the adjudicators consti-
tute part of the administrative policymaking scheme, 
which, although
largely concerned with application of administrative 
policy, is never-
theless bound by established law and Congress's 
limited grant of juris-
diction to it. The Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp ALJ 
dream team, along
with a cadre of other adjudicators similarly situated in an administra-
tive agency, could thereby establish precedent 
in cases between indi-
vidual litigants and later rely-and cause other agency 
adjudicators to
rely-on that precedent in deciding future cases.
Although ALJs under most statutory schemes may 
occasionally
depart from established precedent, courts generally 
disfavor it. It is
occasionally allowed, however, in those circumstances 
where a particu-
lar case calls for the establishment of a new rule 
or alternative treat-
ment.10 4 In these instances, the AUJ behaves more 
like a policymaker
than an actual judge. The ALJ sets policy that potentially 
departs
from agency precedent but still preserves 
his adjudicatory duties.10 5
His quasi-policymaker, quasi-adjudicator role evokes images 
of Judge
Weinstein's managerial judging mentioned in Part I. Unlike 
general-
ists like Judge Weinstein, however, ALJs possess 
expertise in their
respective fields appropriate to resolve complex 
cases -1° 6 And unlike
arbitrators, their decisions demand precedential 
deference from
future adjudicators.'0 7 The ideal ALJ in this scheme is therefore 
an
expert adjudicator who can slip on a policymaking hat from 
time to
time, and upon whose decisions future litigants 
can rely.
103 See Magill, supra note 95, at 1394, 1399 (noting that 
orders of the NLRB and
FERC operate as precedent and also noting 
which agencies rely mainly on adjudica-
tion and which on rulemaking); see also Charles H. Koch, Jr., 
Policymaking by the Admin-
istrative Judiciary, 56 ALA. L. REV. 693, 703-05 
("Stare decisis is not the rule in
administrative adjudications [although] ... agencies. .are 
held to precedent only
until a change can be justified. . . .[Aidministrative law 
demands consistency in
agency adjudicative decisions . . . but consistency attentive 
to the need for dynamic
administration.").
104 See Koch, supra note 103, at 705 (arguing that agencies 
must have the flexibility
to allow their law to evolve and "adjust to the real world 
and to learn from
experience").
105 See id. at 720-30 (advocating for greater ALJ policy 
participation through lib-
eral intervention, record-building, and liberal 
use of the rules of evidence in
adjudications).
106 See Murphy, supra note 101, at 1033 (noting that the 
notion of Chevron defer-
ence is predicated in part on the fact that "agencies 
generally possess greater techno-
cratic expertise than courts").
107 NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 
759, 765-66 (1969) ("Adjudicated
cases . . . [slubject to the qualified role of stare decisis 
in the administrative pro-
cess . . . serve as precedents.").
SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION
This Part showed how administrative courts can attain the princi-
ples of institutional legitimacy and precedential value-indispensable
attributes of our common law system that are largely absent from
ADR. Part III will consider attributes of an inverse quality from those
discussed in Part II: efficiency and expertise are the hallmarks of any
good arbitration panel, but generally elude the grasp of traditional
adjudication.
III. EFFICIENCY AND EXPERTISE
Part 11 commenced with a question of purpose. This Part will do
the same: Why are efficiency and expertise important elements of a
system of adjudication? First, litigants want it, and if adjudicatory
regimes place themselves at the service of litigants, then litigants
shouldn't be made to feel unserved. As shown in the introduction,
revolutions in adjudication occur when litigants are dissatisfied with
what they are getting."' Nowhere can one see this more markedly
than in the context of ADR. The common sense view is that litigants
shun traditional forms of adjudication in favor of alternative dispute
resolution for a myriad of reasons. 0 9 Litigants and the legal commu-
nity in general have voiced complaints about the lack of expertise
among judges, 10 the inefficiency of the process,"'1 and the panacea
108 See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
109 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Dispute Resolution: The Periphery Becomes the Core, 69
JUDICATuRE 300, 300 (1986) (noting that the forces underlying ADR developments
focused on "participation, flexibility of both process and result and access to justice of
those previously f6reclosed"). Additionally, see Judge Posner's opinion in an appeal
from a 60(b) order setting aside an arbitration award, which noted that the defendant
"wanted something different from judicial dispute resolution. It wanted dispute reso-
lution by experts in the insurance industry who were bound to have greater knowl-
edge of the parties, based on previous professional experience, than an Article [I
judge, or a jury." Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir.
1983).
110 See e.g., MAURO RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LAw 200
(1990) (listing the criteria for choosing international arbitrators as "experience of the
arbitrator, preferably in the specific area" and the "arbitrator's knowledge of the lan-
guages of the litigants or of the language in which the proceedings will take place");
Wayne D. Brazil et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute
Resolution, 69 JUDiCATuRE 279, 284 (1986) (noting the criteria for choosing neutrals in
early neutral evaluation as including "reputation for good judgment and fairness,
experience in litigation, and to the extent possible, expertise in the subject area"); see
also Michael Noone, Mediating Personal Injury Disputes, in RETHINKING DispuTES 23, 40
(Julie Macfarlane ed., 1997) (noting the complexity of personal injury compensation
and the "need for depth of knowledge in personal injury law" among mediators).
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that ADR can provide."12 Second, certain cases demand efficiency
and expertise, and litigants in those cases often cannot trust the tech-
nical ability of a generalist judge. The cases mentioned by the
presenters at the 1976 Pound Conference are illustrative.' 1 3 Antitrust
provides perhaps the most prominent and complex example,' 1 4 but
other areas of the law can prove to be just as complex and just as
wanting of a technically-sound decisionmaker. I I5 Third, democracy
demands efficient and precise resolution of disputes. Completely
aside from efficiency's embodiment in our nation's founding docu-
ments,' 1 6 the undercurrents of demands for efficiency as a democratic
necessity color the literature of the legal field.1 17
Administrative law courts respond to these demands. From their
very inception, administrative agencies were billed as expert disinter-
ested regulatory regimes that could deal with issues of commerce,
111 See RUBINO-SAMMARTANO, supra note 110, at 200 ("Those trained in law some-
times indulge in slow... proceedings... which is exactly what the parties usually wish
to avoid by referring the dispute to arbitration.").
112 See Brazil et al., supra note 110, at 279 (noting studies showing that expediting
pleadings and discovery through mediation can speed adjudication).
113 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25 (citing antitrust cases involving
thousands of documents, hundreds of witnesses and dozens of lawyers in a complex
area of the law).
114 See, e.g., FYC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 462 (1986). In this case,
the defendants made certain pro-competitive justifications for concertedly withhold-
ing x-ray information from insurance companies, among them that "x-rays, standing
alone, are not adequate bases for diagnosis of dental problems or for the formulation
of an acceptable course of treatment." Id. Whether a district court would he
equipped to answer that question and others inevitably arising in the course of litiga-
tion is a point of dispute.
115 See Kowalchyk, supra note 30, at 30 (discussing the use of ADR in IP context);
see also Dianne Saxe, Water Disputes in Ontario: Environmental Dispute Resolution and the
Public Interest, in RETHuNKINc DispurFs, supra note 110, at 233, 237 (noting the appeal
of "technically qualified mediators" in environmental disputes).
116 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (providing right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury in criminal prosecutions).
117 See Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 564 (noting that litigation has sprawled into a
complex system in which attorneys often have the most at stake, clients have lost their
ability to "decide whether, when, where, and against whom to bring suit," and
extreme expenses and delays are more often the norm than not (citing In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1296, 1338-40, 1344-46 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)
(costing $9 million in attorneys' fees in $180 million class settlement with 2.4 million
plaintiffs))); see also Burger, supra note 15, at 92 ("Jurors, witnesses and litigants con-
tinue to have their time squandered. They are . . .shuffled about court-houses in
confusion caused by poor management within the courts. The delays and high costs
in resolving civil disputes continue to frighten away potential litigants.").
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energy resources, drugs, etc. more effectively than Congress.'1 8 Obvi-
ously, the regulatory state itself has its critics."t 9 Rather than tackle
the criticisms of the administrative state from the nondelegation per-
spective, I will focus instead upon the adjudicators within administra-
tive agencies-administrative law judges. 12 0
The expertise virtues of using administrative courts in specialized
adjudication arise from the nature of the adjudicators themselves.
The Office of Personnel Management examines, certifies, and
appoints competent ALJs through a lengthy process of interviews,
tests, and evaluations.' 12 Through a practice known as "selective certi-
fication," ALJ candidates with particularized expertise can receive
preference in appointment as long as they have two years of experi-
ence hearing formal cases in the field. 122 An individual agency, such
as the FTC for example, when seeking to appoint ALJs with special-
ized antitrust knowledge-such as the Posner-Pitofsky-Hovenkamp
panel-could select them on the basis of expertise "in the field of
[antitrust] law."' 23 The agency-and, incidentally, those appearing
before agency adjudicators-therefore have an expectation that the
adjudicators possess the requisite expertise.
Additionally, the expertise of the ALJs within each agency will be
implemented over the jurisdiction that each agency possesses. Rather
than submitting their disputes before a traditional forum of general
jurisdiction, litigants could bring their disputes before specialized
tribunals. Because each agency possesses its own ALJs, whose skills are
specially tailored to adjudicating specialized disputes, litigants will
gain the benefits of expert adjudications that those agencies offer. In
118 LMDIS, supra note 71, at 154-55 (1938) (referring to agency administrators as
men of professional attainment in various fields").
119 See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power:
A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DuKE L.J. 267, 326-34 (1993)
(arguing that the Necessary and Proper Clause is an affirmative grant of legislative
power, but it is limited by the word "proper" and by underlying constitutional princi-
ples, including separation of powers); Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the
Rise of the Administrative State: Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 COR-
NELL L. REv. 1,9 (1994) (advocating a formalist approach to separation of powers that
would permit "[n]o commingling of legislative, executive or judicial power... except
where specifically provided in the constitutional text" and acknowledging that such a
model would not harmonize with the current administrative state). The nondelega-
tion concerns raised by these authors are beyond the scope of this Note.
120 See supra Part II (discussing ALJs in the CFTC).
121 SeeJeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible
Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REv. 109, 112-20 (1981).
122 Id. at 117-19,
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allusion to the Introduction, ALJ adjudications could take place
before SEC ALJs in securities actions, Antitrust 
Division ALJs in
anticompetitive practice actions, CFTC ALJs in commodities 
trading
actions, etc.
In addition to the advantages of expertise that agencies can offer,
efficiency advantages also exist. These advantages 
arise from the lib-
eral use of evidence rules that ALJs can utilize.'
24 This phenomenon
is not without its critics.'
25 The rationale for permitting such effi-
ciency depends upon expertise of the adjudicator. An expert ALJ 
is
more likely to recognize the difference between useless 
and mislead-
ing nonhearsay evidence on the one hand, and useful 
instructive hear-
say evidence on the other; in admitting the latter 
and excluding the
former, he expedites a process that might otherwise 
necessitate count-
less motions and procedural safeguards in the federal courts. 
Further,
the use of agency adjudication obviates the concern some litigants
have with subjecting their disputes to a jury of their peers. Litigants'
fears that jury manipulation and jury ineptitude preclude precise reso-
lution of disputes have manifested themselves in such 
cynical slogans
as: "[C]ross examination invariably does no more than demonstrate
forensic talent or score trial points irrelevant 
to the final decision."'
26
With thousands of dollars on the line, the last thing 
a litigant wants is
a judge or a jury susceptible to technical hocus pocus and junk
science.127
124 See 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000); see also 17 C.F.R. § 12.312(e) 
(2006) (providing
for admissibility of evidence in CFTFC formal adjudications). "Relevant, 
material and
reliable evidence shall be admitted. Irrelevant, immaterial, 
unreliable and unduly
repetitious evidence shall be excluded." Id.
125 See, e.g., Graham, supra note 86, at 367-84 (advocating 
for application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence in administrative hearings, arguing 
that the APA standard,
5 U.S.C. § 556(d), does not avoid delays by eliminating argument 
over admissibility,
but increases them by creating "voluminous records 
through the submission of mar-
ginally relevant. . . evidence" and noting that some 
agencies-including the NLRB
and the FCC-apply the Federal Rules of Evidence 
"so far as practicable," but that
such an approach is unpredictable). But see Ernest Gellhorn, 
Rules of Evidence and
Official Notice in Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DulE L.J. 1, 1 
(arguing against the
use of Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) in formal adjudications); 
id. at 14 (noting
that hearsay evidence-otherwise excluded under 
FRE-is sometimes more reliable
than direct evidence and that its exclusion would not 
make sense before an ALJ, who
"is equally exposed to the evidence whether he 
admits or excludes it"); id. at 37
(noting other ALJ deviations from FRE, including substitution 
of written for oral evi-
dence; in general, an ALJ should be able to rely 
on his expertise).
126 Gellhorn, supra note 125, at 40.
127 See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Quackspertise, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 30, 2006, at A9.
Bernstein notes the extreme example of lawsuits arising 
in those state courts that have
not adopted the rule of evidence formulated in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
SPECIALIZED ADJUDICATION
Using ALJs to hear litigation begs its own questions: To what
extent is the ALJ beholden to the agency? How much weight does the
decision of the ALJ carry-i.e. are agencies free to overrule him?
Does the administrative process not merely add another layer to the
adjudicatory system-i.e. to what extent can parties just appeal an ALJ
decision to a district or appellate court?128
The first question raises issues of prosecutorial and judicial inde-
pendence. If the ALJ is beholden to a prosecuting agency, then-as
the theory goes-he will be more likely to find in favor of the
agency1 29 In reality, both Congress and the agency itself can provide
a buffer between the ALJ and the prosecuting agency. The CFTC, for
instance, has promulgated a regulation providing ALJs "will not be
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any ...
employee . . . of the Commission engaged in . . . investigative or
prosecutorial functions."130 Furthermore, the proposed hybrid system
of administrative adjudication contemplates actions between private
litigants in which the agencies themselves are not parties to the case--
similar to the disgruntled customer provision of the CFTC. I31
509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993), requiring general acceptance of expert methodology within
the scientific community. Bernstein, supra. Theoretically, Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence would preclude such evidence in federal court. FED. R. EvID. 702.
128 For an article discussing the virtues of choosing one body of substantive law
over another (in this case, election law versus tax law) to resolve issues, including a
discussion of the implications of agency capture, see Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much
Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. RFv. (forthcoming June 2007) (manu-
script at 17, 24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925529.
129 This concern would come up, for example, in the context of SEC or FTC inves-
tigations. The FTC can investigate potential antitrust violations, bring these before an
ALJ within the FTC, and prosecute the violator based upon the findings. See, e.g., 16
C.F.R. § 3.2 (2006) (providing for formal proceedings for those violations of statutes
requiring determination "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing").
The SEC, likewise, can investigate securities trading improprieties, bring these before
an ALJ in an SEC action, and prosecute the violators based upon the findings. See,
e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12j, 15 U.S.C. § 7810) (2000) (providing for
SEC suspension of a security after a hearing "on the record after notice and
opportunity").
130 17 C.F.R. § 12.8 (2006); see Bruff, supra note 10, at 346-47 (noting that Con-
gress often separates adjudicators from the rest of the agency, but that results are
inconclusive as to whether "split enforcement" better promotes fairness); see also 17
C.F.R. § 12.305 (2006) (allowing the parties to a formal adjudication to "request an
[ALJI to disqualify himself on the grounds of personal bias, conflict of interest, or
similar bases" and allowing the parties to seek an interlocutory review by the agency of
the ALJ's decision).
131 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2000); see supra text accompanying note 99 (discussing the dis-
gruntled customer suit provision of the CTFC Act and Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-53 (1986)).
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Although the agency may have an interest in a particular 
outcome, it
will lack as strong an incentive to intervene. 
Additionally, agencies
cannot dangle the threat of removal over an ALJ; they 
are removable
only after a hearing for good cause as determined 
by the Merit Sys-
tems Protection Board.
3 2
The second question-agency reversal of ALJ decisions-has 
a
long case history to allay any fears of it occurring. 
First, final deterni-
nations of the ALJ become final if not appealed 
to the agency within
the time period specified in the agency's organic 
statute.1 33 Although
agencies do on occasion decide against the 
decisions of ALJs, the
courts frown upon such agency activism.
1 3 4 Furthermore, Congress
could theoretically provide a statutory provision 
in the hybrid system
statute restricting or stripping agency review 
of ALJ decisions, unless
manifestly against agency regulations 
or statute. 1
35
To the third question-appeals of final agency 
decisions to a fed-
eral court-one could say that although agency 
decisions are appeala-
ble,13 6 courts are not expected to review the merits 
or the application
of law in a particular case, but merely ask whether 
the agency acted
within the boundaries set by Congress in the 
agency's enabling stat-
ute.3 7 The substance of the agency decision 
itself is subject to defer-
132 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2000).
133 See id. § 557(b) (providing for appeal to the agency 
from an ALJ decision if
made within the time provided by individual 
agency rule).
134 See LAWSON, supra note 88, at 384. Initial 
findings by ALJs "often carry great
weight with reviewing courts .... [A]gencies generally 
need to have very good reasons
for rejecting credibility determinations made by adjudicators 
who actually saw the
witnesses." Id. In fact, as Lawson later notes, 
"agencies must explicitly account for the
findings of initial adjudicators," meaning that in reviewing 
the ALJ's formal findings,
the agency must provide reasoning and justification for why 
the ALJ decided a case
incorrectly. Id.; see Kimn v. Dep't of Treasury, 
61 F.3d 888, 892 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(overturning agency rejection of ALJ findings and stating 
that agency must "articu-
late [ sound reasons, based on [a] record [largely compiled 
by the ALJ] for its con-
trary evaluation").
135 Completely stripping agency review of ALJ decisions 
would essentially make
administrative courts similar to legislative courts 
like the Tax Court. See Bruff, supra
note 10, at 345 (noting that Article I Tax Court judges "reside 
in separate organiza-
tions from the agencies they review").
136 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (making agency actions subject to 
judicial review); see, e.g., 7
U.S.C. § 18(e) (permitting appeal of any CFTC order filed 
under disgruntled securi-
ties customer statute to a United States Court 
of Appeals).
137 See supra note 101 (discussing the Chevron two-step 
analysis of agency action).
In Chevron, the Court reviewed a regulation of 
the Environmental Protection Agency
allowing states that had not attained certain national 
air quality standards to establish
permit programs regulating "new or modified 
major stationary sources," of pollution.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b) (6) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7502(c) (5) (2000)).
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ence and the court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency, as long as the agency remains within the bounds of
an unambiguous statute.138 A look at statistical evidence from one
particular agency suggests that the rate of appeals from agency deci-
sions is not that high; 159 the threat of specialized AL adjudication
simply constituting an additional layer of review therefore remains
low. Judge Robert Bork has even gone so far as to suggest that dis-
putes arising in administrative courts and other Article I courts should
be denied access to Article III courts unless "an important question of
statutory construction or constitutional law was raised."1 40 While the
notion is undoubtedly interesting, it extends beyond the scope of this
Note. Ultimately, the important assertion of the preceding
paragraphs is that the structural attributes of agency adjudication do
not inhibit their efficiency.
The use of administrative courts is not without its concerns, how-
ever. Agency "capture" is a common concern of critics of administra-
tive agencies. 4 ' One commentator has noted that the "tension
The regulation allowed a state to "adopt a plantwide definition of the term 'stationary
source,'" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840, meaning the state could consider all of the pollu-
tion-emitting devices of a plant to be one "stationary source" for purposes of the EPA.
Consequently, a state could permit a plant to install new equipment as long as the
installation would not increase total emission from the plant. Chevron sued, and the
Supreme Court held for the agency, id. at 865-66, creating the Chevron deference
two-step analysis discussed in note 101.
138 This statement obviously produces some tension with my assertion in Part I1,
that ALJ decisions can serve as precedent because courts expect them to reach results
consistent with previous adjudications. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
Given courts' reluctance to approve retroactive orders arising from agency adjudica-
tions, and recent hostility toward agency decisions that depart from previous agency
precedent, one can say that while courts will give deference to ALJ decisions-a la
Chevron-they will be loathe to do so when the ALJ departs from precedent upon
which the parties to a dispute had relied.
139 U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMM'N, BIENNIAL REPORT-
FY 1998-1999, app. A, available at http://www.oshrc.gov/publications/biennial/bien-
nial98-99.html. The OSHRC received 2324 new cases in 1999: 156 of those were dis-
posed of by ALJs after a formal hearing, 2025 of which were disposed of by ALJs
without a formal hearing, and 43 were disposed of by commissioners. Of these cases,
28 were appealed to the circuit courts. Id.
140 Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231,
238-39 (1976).
141 Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory Enforcement: Cooperation, Cap-
ture, and Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81, 107-11 (2002). Zinn discusses capture
theory-the notion that regulators are susceptible to the private interests of the regu-
lated, specifically regulated industries-in the context of environmental regulation
and summarizes the factors most likely to lead to agency "capture" in general. Id. at
108-09. They include: a small number of regulated interest groups, scarcity of
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between expertise and bias has existed for centuries. 142 Although
both these concerns and the concerns involving ALJ independence
from the agency itself are valid, solutions exist. Congress could, as it
has done in past statutes, provide for ALJ independence in enabling
statutes.1 43 Additionally, it could provide for procedural safeguards in
the selection of ALJs. 144 Finally, the administrative structure and sub-
sequent case law themselves have insulated ALJ decisions from the
intervention of their employing agency. 145
An additional concern comes from the use of alternative non-ALJ
"presiding officers" or administrative judges (AJs) in agency adjudica-
tions.146 AJs enjoy even less protection from agency bias than ALJs
and are generally regarded as less qualified than ALJs. Typically, how-
ever, they are not employed in formal adjudication. 147 The answer to
the AJ quandary lies in Congress simply eliminating their use or pro-
viding similar criteria for hiring as apply to ALJs. Although this valid
agency resources, regulated groups' influence over elected officials, and the tendency
of agency regulators to regulate with an eye toward jobs in regulated industries. Id. at
108-11; see also ROGER G. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 40-43 (1971) ("Most regula-
tory issues are of deep interest to regulated industries ... .
142 Bruff, supra note 10, at 346.
143 See supra note 130.
144 As mentioned in this Part, hiring of ALJs is done by the Office of Personnel
Management. See 5 U.S.C. § 5362 (2000).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 130-34.
146 SeeJudith Resnik, Judicial Independence and Article III: Too Little and Too Much, 72
S. CAL. L. REv, 657, 659 (1999); see also Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the
Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70-73, 77 (1996) (noting the
differences between ALJs and non-ALJs). Lubbers notes that the number of ALJs not
working in either the NLRB, the Department of Labor, or the Social Security Admin-
istration declined from 170 to 155 between 1984 and 1996. Id. at 70. The number of
AJs-who on average earn approximately $40,000 less than AJs-rose to 2692 in
1989. Id. at 70-73. In contrast to the hiring of AJs, the hiring of ALJs is a highly
scrutinized process. The agency must oftentimes "giv[eI short shrift to special exper-
tise" unless the applicant has extensive litigation or formal hearing experience. Id. at
73. Lubbers advocates reinstituting a multi-grade structure of hiring ALJs, retaining
the ALJ title, and providing a "real career path for aspiring administrativejudges." Id.
at 77. For the specialized hybrid system to have success, I believe it should preserve
the integrity of the ALJ office. Therefore, I agree with Lubbers's contentions.
147 This is not to say that AJs and other "presiding officers" are never employed in
what one commentator has called "relatively formal adjudications." SeeJeffery Lub-
bers, Federal Agency Adjudications: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. B. NEWS &
J. 383, 387 (1984). Lubbers's article discusses congressional efforts in the 1980s to
separate ALJs from their respective agencies and to create a national corps of ALJs,
concentrated mainly in the Department of Labor and the Social Security Administra-
tion. Id. at 385-86. Lubbers notes that the congressional plan failed to account for
the hundreds of AJs and presiding officers that hear substantially more-albeit less
formal-cases than ALJs. Id.
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concern warrants additional discussion, it is beyond the scope of this
Note.
This Part has shown how administrative courts would provide an
answer to the efficiency and expertise concerns at the heart of ADR's
complaints against traditional adjudication. Part IV poses a more sali-
ent question: Is this sort of thing even constitutional?
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SPECIALTY HYBRID SYSTEM
Policies advocating reform do not exist in a legal vacuum. Consti-
tutional restraints prohibit the creation of certain types of courts, cer-
tain types of adjudication, and certain acts of Congress. Congress may
face limitations in implementing a system of non-Article III 'jury-less"
adjudications. Additionally, in providing for adjudications in an
administrative forum, Congress has disturbed certain due process
rights associated with Article III judicial independence. To what
extent is Congress even authorized to strip the federal courts of juris-
diction and to what extent is Congress authorized to then place that
jurisdiction in the hands of ALJs?
A. Jury Trial
The 1976 Pound Conference produced a plethora of vitriolic crit-
icism directed toward traditional means of adjudication. 148 The con-
ference participants reserved a most healthy dose of that criticism for
the use of the jury trial in civil cases in the United States. Indeed, the
United States is an anomaly in this regard;149 but the arguments for
"preser[ving]" the Seventh Amendment's cherished right to a jury
trial have, over the years, retained their vitality, emphasizing the Sev-
enth Amendment's role as a harbinger of democracy. 50 This occurs
much to the chagrin of reformers,' 5 1 who note concerns with runaway
148 See supra notes 14-29 and accompanying text.
149 See RowE T AL., supra note 44, at 218-19.
150 U.S. CONST. amend VII ("[W] here the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."); see also Jean R. Sternlight,
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury
Trial, 16 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669, 671 (2001) ("The federal Constitutional
right to a jury trial has long been deemed one of the fundamental elements of our
system ofjustice."); Ellen E. Sward, Legislative Courts, Article III, and the Seventh Amend-
ment, 77 N.C. L. REv. 1037, 1056-57 (1999) (noting that jury service "brings commu-
nity values into the judicial process . . . educates the citizenry" and ensures "political
participation").
151 See Tidmarsh, supra note 11, at 547 (noting strong arguments in support of
such items of American exceptionalism as the jury trial). Tidmarsh cautions that
"nostalgia blind[s] us to the trend line .... [W]e must develop a clear understanding
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jury verdicts and damages awards,1 52 technical incompetence,1 53 and
susceptibility to deft attorney "gamesmanship." I 54
The Supreme Court announced the test for application of the
jury right in Chauffers Local No. 391 v. Teny.155 Money damages suits
that would have required a jury at common law at the time of the
nation's founding must be tried before ajury.1 56 Exceptions do exist,
however, for certain complex issues. 157 Additionally, the jury right's
vitality shows susceptibility in the context of waiver.' 58 Although, as
one commentator has noted, courts are reluctant to enforce pure jury
trial waiver without the parties' negotiation and knowing consent to
the waiver, this reluctance dissipates in the context of arbitration. 59
As noted earlier in the mass tort context, 160 arbitration clauses can
take cases out of traditional adjudicatory forums before their facts
even materialize, and can place them in the hands of arbitrators. The
Supreme Court itself favors and enforces arbitration clauses, despite
their effective evisceration of the jury trial right.161
of the procedural pieces we must ... jettison." Id.; see supra notes 14-30 and accom-
panying text.
152 See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 431 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The size of the trial jury's verdict in State Farm prompted
Justice Ginsburg to state "Itlhe large size of the award ... in this case indicates why
damages-capping legislation may be altogether fitting and proper." Id. Justice Gins-
burg dissented on grounds that the Court had attempted to reform state law of puni-
tive damages through use of the Due Process Clause. Id.
153 See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (In rejapanese Elec.
Prods. Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting the complexity of
an antitrust case precluded trial by jury).
154 Kirkham, supra note 7, at 205.
155 494 U.S. 558, 564-65 (1990).
156 Id.
157 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388-91 (1996) (per-
mitting the judge to determine the construction of certain terms of art within a claim
before a jury); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (holding in a
trademark damages case that to maintain a suit at equity, rather than at law before a
jury, "the plaintiff must ... show that the [case is] of such a 'complicated nature' that
only a court of equity can satisfactorily unravel [it]" (quoting Kirby v. Lake Shore &
Mich. S. R.R., 120 U.S. 130, 134 (1887))); Matushita, 631 F.2d at 1084 (holding that
"[D]ue process precludes trial by jury when a jury is unable to [decide rationally and
resolve each disputed issue on the basis of a fair and reasonable assessment of the
evidence . . . and application of relevant legal rules]").
158 FED. R. Crv. P. 38(d) (jury trial of right waived if not asserted); see Sternlight,
supra note 150, at 678.
159 Sternlight, supra note 150, at 695.
160 Gilles, supra note 62, at 375.
161 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-33 (1991) (find-
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In using waiver as a way for the hybrid-specialty 
system to avoid
Seventh Amendment impediments, there would, 
of course, be a trick
in luring litigants who might otherwise negotiate 
for an arbitration
clause. This Note operates under the assumption 
that Congress's sys-
tem would offer the attractive aforementioned 
attributes-efficiency
and expertise ' 62-from Part III. But even 
if litigants could be per-
suaded to negotiate for ,hybrid-specialty-court 
clauses," it is questiona-
ble whether waiver could or even should 
be used as a way for hybrid-
specialty system of administrative courts 
to get around the Seventh
Amendment. Although litigants may waive 
individual rights, they may
not waive institutional rights. And while the 
jury trial is most defini-
tively an individual right, rights such as separation 
of powers-also
implicated by trying cases in administrative 
courts-are most defini-
tively nonwaivable institutional rights. Additionally, 
litigants must
waive their jury right knowingly-although the Supreme 
Court has
never so held. 163 As mentioned previously, 
waiver most often occurs
in the contractual context.
1 64 Manufacturers, credit card companies,
or even cruise lines 6
5 may insert arbitration clauses-and presumably
also "hybrid-specialty-court clauses"-in contracts 
and purchasing
agreements that later compel parties to arbitrate 
any disputes without
a trial. While courts have been receptive 
of this, they might not be
receptive of such clauses compelling actual 
adjudication before an
administrative court, unless the waiver is made 
knowingly.
Matters involving complicated technicalities 
may-according to
one court-even require a nonjury trial to protect due process.
166 This
sentiment has appeared in Supreme 
Court jurisprudence as well,1
67
dispute notwithstanding the employee's claims 
that arbitration deprived him of ajudi-
cial forum, is susceptible to bias toward the 
employer, permits only limited discovery,
fails to produce written opinions, and is subject to limited judicial 
review); Sternlight,
supra note 150, at 695-96; see also Thomas 
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473
U.S. 568, 583-93 (1985) (showing the Court's amenability 
to Congress selecting bind-
ing arbitration as a forum for resolving disputes, 
despite Article Il).
162 The Seventh Amendment's most ardent 
supporters have also noted these par-
ticular attributes as constituting the strongest 
arguments underlying the administra-
tive state's nonjury trial status. See Sward, supra note 150, 
at 1108-11.
163 Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Hendrix, 
565 F.2d 255, 258 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1977).
164 See Gilles, supra note 62, at 425-26.
165 See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 
499 U.S. 585, 587 (1991).
166 Matushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp. (In rejapanese Elec. Prods.
Antitrust Litig.), 631 F.2d 1069, 1084 (1980).
167 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, 
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996). In
patent cases "a jury's capabilities to evaluate demeanor... 
or to reflect community
standards are much less significant than a trained 
ability to evaluate the testimony in
relation to the overall structure of the patent." 
Id.
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but has not gained nearly enough traction to justify predicating an
entire adjudicatory system upon these holdings. 168
In reality, however, the concern over the Seventh Amendment
undermining the hybrid-specialty system might not even matter. As
one commentator has noted, even if the litigants to a hybrid-court
dispute had not waived their right to a jury trial, "[lthe Court has
permitted legislative courts to assert jurisdiction over public... rights
without regard to the consent of the litigants. '169
B. Article III Values: Adjudication Before an Administrative Tribunal
Congress has authorized quasi-judicial acts before non-Article III
courts, commissions, and other entities since its early history. 170 But is
such authorization constitutional? Can Congress enact a statute and
mandate that all causes of action arising under that statute be adjudi-
cated before a non-Article III court?
The Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of such
arrangements in Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 171
In Murray's Lessee, the plaintiff-a federal tax collector for the port of
New York-had accumulated excess accounts in violation of his
employment obligations.1 72 The Solicitor of the Treasury, acting pur-
suant to an act of Congress permitting liens to be laid on lands of
persons indebted to the United States, 73 issued a "warrant of distress"
for the balance found after an audit of the plaintiff's account.1 74 The
plaintiff raised two objections to the auditing and warrant. First, he
argued that the warrant constituted a taking of property without due
process of law1 75 Second, he argued that Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution required such judicial power as the issuance of a warrant
to be situated firmly in the judicial branch. 176 The Court disagreed.
Although-as the court admitted-"the auditing of the accounts of a
168 See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 478 (1962) (noting that "it will
indeed be a rare case in which" the plaintiff can prove the burden of showing that
issues are too complicated for a jury to comprehend).
169 Sward, supra note 150, at 1116; see Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 585-90 (1985).
170 See RICHARD FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. METZLER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 919 (5th ed. 2003).
171 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
172 Id. at 274-75.
173 Act of May 15, 1820, ch. 107, 3 Stat. 592, 592-96 (codified as amended at 31
U.S.C. § 506 (2000)).






receiver of public moneys may be . . .a judicial act," 
certain actions,
while susceptible of the designation 'judicial," do not necessarily
require the exercise of judicial power.
7 7 Congress therefore had the
right-through its "power to collect and disburse 
revenue, and to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying that
power into effect"-to grant the power to issue warrants 
to an execu-
tive administrative entity.
178 The Court ultimately relied upon a dis-
tinction between "public rights" and "private rights," 
permitting non-
Article III courts to adjudicate "public rights." 
79 The question that
such reliance begs is: what counts as a "public 
right?" The Court's
answer to that question over the next century-and-a-half 
determines
the constitutionality of the proposed administrative 
specialty court
system.
Crowell v. Benson'80 was the first case to uphold 
the use of adminis-
trative agencies as adjunct courts. 181 In Crowell, the court relied 
upon
Murray's Lessee's distinction between public 
and private rights
82 to
uphold statutory provisions permitting determination 
of compensa-
tion awards by the Employees' Compensation 
Commission. 183 The
plaintiff in Crowell had challenged the validity 
of statutory provisions
permitting extrajudicial determinations of compensation awards 
owed
by admiralty employers to employees killed while 
on the job.8 4 The
Court ruled that because such compensation 
fell within the legislative
process and therefore within the legislative 
authority, the legislature
could choose the means of determining issues 
of fact validating com-
pensation.185 Because the dispute centered around 
a governmental
benefits program that Congress could have chosen 
to withhold, the
177 Id. at 280, 282-83.
178 Id. at 281.
179 Id. at 284.
180 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
181 Id. at 62-65.
182 Id. at 50 ("'[T]here are matters, involving public 
rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable 
of acting on them . . but
which congress may or may not bring within the 
cognizance of the courts ... as it may
deem proper.'" (quoting Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 283-86)). The Mur-
ray's Lessee Court's opinion had held that a plaintiff's 
status as a public servant, com-
bined with his public debt owed to a public 
agency made his case one of "public
rights" and thus susceptible to extra-judicial determination. 
Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S.
(18 How.) at 283-85.
183 Crowe4 285 U.S. at 60-62.
184 Id. at 36-37 (citing Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act,
Pub. L. No. 69-803, 44 Stat. 1424 (codified as amended 
at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(2000)).
185 Id. at 58.
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Court ruled that it constituted a "public right" susceptible of-but not
requiring-judicial determination. 8 6
This particular definition of "public rights"-rights associated
with congressionally created benefits programs-underlay the Court's
momentous reassembly of the federal bankruptcy court in Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.18 7 Justice Brennan,
writing for a slim plurality, admitted that "[t]he distinction between
public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in
our precedents."' 88 He then relied on "public rights" doctrine to limit
the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. t8 9 Northern Pipeline involved a
common law contract case brought before the bankruptcy court-a
legislative court created by Congress whose core function was "the
restructuring of debtor-creditor relations."190 Justice Brennan ruled
that while this core function-involving a "public right" created by the
Bankruptcy Act-was indeed a permissible exercise of jurisdiction,
jurisdiction over common law contract claims-as differentiated from
the Bankruptcy court's normal docket of restructuring cases-was not
allowed. 19 1
Justice White dissented, noting that the plurality's holding
threatened-as it most surely did-the entire administrative state. 92
Indeed, Justice Brennan addressed this seeming inconsistency, albeit
rather awkwardly, saying that as long as the "essential attributes of
judicial power are retained in the Art. III court," the Article I court
could withstand constitutional scrutiny. 19 3
Justice White's dissent, which argued for allowing Congress to
balance Article III virtues with administrative efficiency values,19 4 bore
186 Id. at 50.
187 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
188 Id. at 69.
189 Id. at 71-72, 76. Brennan also noted that exceptions to Article IlI adjudication
had been made in a limited number of circumstances, namely territorial courts
(before westward expansion in the nineteenth century), courts-martial, and adminis-
trative courts adjudicating purely "public rights." Id. at 71.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 102, 113 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that the decision threatened "a
large body of administrative law" and, read literally, would "overrule a large number
of our precedents upholding a variety of Art. I courts-not to speak of those [Article]
I courts that go by the contemporary name of 'administrative agencies'"); see also
Martin H. Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline
Decision, 1983 DuKE L.J. 197, 214-24 (rejecting as inadequate both Justice Brennan's
and justice White's approaches).
193 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 81 (majority opinion).
194 Id. at 117-18 (White, J., dissenting).
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fruit in later Court opinions. First in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricul-
tural Products Co.' 95 and later in Commodity Futures Trading Commission
V. Schor,1 9 6 the Court upheld the constitutionality of federally man-
dated adjudication in non-Article III forums. In Union Carbide, the
Court permitted Congress to require binding arbitration of claims
filed under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 19 7
with limited Article III judicial review. 198
Union Carbide relied on Crowelfs proposition that cases arising
from rights created by federal regulatory programs-"public rights"-
are susceptible to non-Article III adjudication. 199 This effectively
rejected Northern Pipeline's definition of "public rights" (public benefit
programs or instances where the government is a party to the case) 20 0
in lieu of a new one (federal regulatory programs). 20 1 Schor contin-
ued this line of reasoning. Schor featured two parties2 0 2-one, a dis-
gruntled stock customer, the second, a broker who the customer had
sued for violation of the Commodities Futures Trading Commission
Act.20 -3 The case was heard before the CFTC who, six years earlier,
had issued a regulation permitting counterclaims arising out of the
same transaction or occurrence as the underlying claim.20 4 The
defendant stock broker in Schor took advantage of the regulation to
counterclaim against the plaintiff.20 5 When the Commission resolved
the case in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff asserted that the Com-
mission never had jurisdiction over the counterclaim.2 0 6
195 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
196 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
197 7 U.S.C.A. § 136 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006).
198 Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 582-84.
199 Id. at 586-89 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)) (echoing Jus-
tice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline that "practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article
niI).
200 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67-68, 71-72
(1982).
201 Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 593-94 ("[Clongress, acting for a valid legislative
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly
'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a
matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III
judiciary.")
202 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 837 (1986).
203 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 § 106, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 18(a), (b) (2000).
204 17 C.F.R. § 12.19 (2006).
205 Schor, 478 U.S. at 837-38.
206 Id. at 838.
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After reviewing the statutory authority, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, relied directly on Union Carbide and implicitly on Jus-
tice White's dissent in Northern Pipeline, stating "resolution of claims
such as [plaintiff's] cannot turn on conclusory reference to the lan-
guage of Article III."2o7 She then addressed the counterclaim, stating
that Congress's interest in providing an expert and expeditious forum
for resolution of the original claims necessarily made common law
counterclaims candidates for administrative adjudication.208 Employ-
ing a four-factor balancing test,20 9 O'Connor relegated the "public
rights" doctrine to jurisprudential oblivion, stating: "there is no rea-
son inherent in separation of powers principles to accord the state law
character of a ['private rights'] claim talismanic power in Article III
inquiries."210
While Schor did not overrule Northern Pipeline explicitly,211 one
must wonder whether Northern Pipeline still has staying power. Schor
seems to permit non-Article III courts to exercise jurisdiction over
cases normally heard by either federal or state court judges, as long as
the case is not terribly important and the judicial power is not terribly
infringed.2 12 Northern Pipeline, however, seemed to deny that same
exercise ofjurisdiction to the Bankruptcy court. Indeed, Justice Bren-
nan, the author of Northern Pipeline's plurality opinion, dissented in
Schor, noting that the Court had favored "legislative convenience" over
the precedent set in Northern Pipeline.2 15 In all likelihood, even if Schor
did not overrule Northern Pipeline, its and Union Carbide's definition of
"public rights" departed from Northern Pipeline's. "Public rights" as
understood by the Union Carbide majority are not rights arising from
207 Id. at 847 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583
(1985)).
208 Id. at 855-57.
209 Id. at 851 ("H] the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power'
are reserved to the Article III courts,. . . (2] the extent to which the non-Article III
forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested only in Article
III courts, [3] the origins and importance of the right to be adjudicated, and [41 the
concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111").
210 Id. at 853.
211 Id. at 852-53. Schor distinguished Northern Pipeline because the bankruptcy
court in that case had expansive jurisdiction over "all civil proceedings arising under
title l1 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)). The Court in Schor reasoned
that although the CFTC had jurisdiction over state law counterclaims arising out of
CfITC proceedings, claimants in the proceedings were required to subsequently seek
enforcement by a district court. Id.
212 Id, at 851.
213 Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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federal benefits programs; nor are they "matters arising between the
Government and persons subject to its authority."2 14 They are instead
rights arising under federal statutes that do not "depend on or replace
a ight... under state law."2 15 Thus, Union Carbide restricted Northern
Pipeline's holding to a prohibition on Congressional "vest[ing] in a
non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment,
and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants."216 And Schor chipped
another chunk off of Northern Pipeline by providing an exception for
common law counterclaims in administrative adjudications. 217 Schor
and Union Carbide permit the hybrid system of expert administrative
adjudication proposed in Part I, not only to the extent that panels will
be able to hear claims arising under federal statutes, but also counter-
claims and related claims arising out of the same facts or
circumstances.
Yet one lingering issue remains: the jury trial. Although the
hybrid system seems to pass Article III muster, it must also withstand
the scrutiny of the Seventh Amendment, Crowell, Union Carbide, and
Schor all involved cases in which the defendant could have sought a
jury, but for the waiver of the jury right by the parties involved. Can
Congress really mandate that litigants try their cases before adminis-
trative tribunals without a jury?
As the Crowell-Union Carbide-Schor line of cases show, the Court has
been receptive to administrative agency adjudication without a jury
trial when the adjudications involve either federal benefits programs
or federal regulatory programs. The bankruptcy court, however, has
had less success before the Court. Aside from Northern Pipeline, the
Court also decided Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,218 holding that a
claim brought by a bankrupt corporation's trustee to void a fraudu-
lent transfer from the corporation's predecessor to its creditor was
entitled to a jury trial where the creditor had not submitted a claim
against the corporation in bankruptcy court.2 19 The trustee of the
corporation in Granfinanciera had filed a petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11.220 The trustee then filed suit within one year of
the petition against petitioner, a Columbian financial institution that
214 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585 (1985) (citing
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67-68).
215 Id. at 584.
216 Id.
217 See supra text accompanying notes 202-14.
218 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
219 Id. at 57-58 & n.13; id. at 64-65.
220 Id. at 36.
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had received $1.7 million from the corporation without considera-
tion.22 ' The petitioner claimed a jury right, but the Bankruptcy court
disagreed. The Supreme Court reversed both that court and the two
lower courts.
In doing so, the Court resurrected the "public rights" doctrine
but noted that for public rights, the Seventh Amendment does not
grant parties a jury right if "Congress assigns its adjudication to an
administrative agency.1222 Although the Court gave no reason for its
apparent distinction between administrative courts and legislative
courts in the jury trial context, the Court has historically treated them
differendy.2 23 One commentator has suggested that this is a mere
result of general deference to the administrative state;2 24 as justice
White noted in Northern Pipeline, a decision of such dismantling mag-
nitude could have momentous effects. 22 5 Other scholars have echoed
the same sentiments, noting that the adjudicatory functions of the
entire administrative state could be thrown into doubt.226 It is also
possible that agencies' greater involvement in the adjudicatory pro-
cess ensures a bit of supervision that the bankruptcy court does not
have.
The Court, however, would resist such a distinction. In its view,
administrative courts and legislative courts are subject to the same
constitutional strictures; the fact that the Bankruptcy court has faired
more poorly than administrative agencies is a product of mere coinci-
dence. The Court in Granfinanciera went to great lengths, in fact, to
preserve nearly all of its non-Article III court case law. It rejected the
Northern Pipeline view that "matter[s] of public rights must at a mini-
mum arise 'between the government and others, "'2 2 7 and emphasized
that private rights "so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution" were per-
221 Id.
222 Id. at 42 n.4,
223 Compare N. Pipeline Constr. Go. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87
(1982) (holding unconstitutional the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over a common
law contract claim that arose out of a restructuring dispute), with Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986) (permitting the CFTC's exer-
cise of jurisdiction over a common law contract counterclaim filed in response to a
claim filed by a disgruntled stock customer alleging a violation of the CFTC Act).
224 See Sward, supra note 150, at 1096-97.
225 N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 102.
226 See, e.g., 1 RicmtARDJ. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.1, at 28-29
(4th ed. 2002) (noting that Northern Pipeline "cast a shadow of uncertain magnitude
over the constitutionality of the adjudicatory powers granted to many agencies").
227 Cranfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (citing N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69).
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missible.228 It declined to decide, however, whether the restructuring
of debtor-creditor relations in bankruptcy constituted, in fact, a "pub-
lic right."229 Additionally, it held that the trustee's fraudulent convey-
ance suit was one that would have been tried before a jury at common
law and thus its entitlement to a jury trial at modern law depended
"upon whether the creditor ha[d] submitted a claim against the
estate, not... upon whether Congress chanced to deny jury trials to
creditors who have not filed claims and who are sued by a trustee to
recover an alleged preference." 2301 In short, the Court found that the
fraudulent conveyance suit was not sufficiently integral to the bank-
ruptcy court's statutory scheme to deserve an exemption from the Sev-
enth Amendment. Had the suit been part of a bankruptcy court
proceeding, however, it is arguable that the Court would have allowed
the suit to proceed without a jury.23 1
Granfinanciera's conclusion ultimately equates its Article III juris-
prudence with its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, and implicitly
affirms the holdings of Union Carbide, Schor, and Crowell: "[T] he ques-
tion whether the Seventh Amendment permits Congress to [use
administrative tribunals] that do[] not employ juries ... requires the
same answer as the question whether Article III allows Congress to
assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribu-
nal."232 Thus, it is clear that nothing in the Seventh Amendment
under Granfinanciera prohibits Congress from accomplishing any-
thing that it can constitutionally accomplish under the Crowell-Schor-
Union Carbide line of cases. Unless a claim coming before an adminis-
trative agency tribunal were either not sufficiently integral to the
228 Id. (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94
(1985) (Brennan,J., concurring)).
229 Id. at 55-56 & n.11. Arguably, much of what the Court currently categorizes as
.public rights" could be interpreted differently. See PIERCE, supra note 226, § 7.1, at
28-29 ("A great deal of what modern federal agencies do can be characterized as
resolution of disputes with respect to private rights."). This demonstrates that one's
point of reference for defining "public rights" will ultimately determine the outcome:
A definition that turns on whether Congress has provided a structure to solve private
disputes will cull more cases into the concept of "public rights," whereas a definition
that turns on the identity of the parties-as Northern Pipeline did-will tend to exclude
more cases from that concept.
230 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 58.
231 This depends, of course, on whether the Court would even consider restructur-
ing to be a "public right." See supra note 211 and accompanying text. For purposes of
an administrative hybrid scheme of adjudication, a court would have to inquire both
as to whether a particular cause of action brought before an agency were sufficiently
integral to the regulatory scheme, and whether that regulatory scheme were even a
.public right."
232 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 53.
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agency's statutory scheme or the statutory scheme 
itself were not con-
sidered to be a "public right," Congress could constitutionally 
assign
that claim to the tribunal.
213
CONCLUSION
The allure of administrative agencies lies not in 
their somewhat
controversial conformance with the Constitution but 
in their ability to
apply expertise to the complexity of cases arising 
in the modern age.
It no longer suffices-nor is it desirable-to have 
a jury of one's peers
decide the fate of an alleged antitrust violator, a 
medical malpractice
victim, or an international contract dispute. 
Congress realizes this.
Litigants realize this. And even courts realize 
this. Although the
nature of traditional adjudication has become more technical 
and
expertoriented,23 4 one must still question whether 
courts or expert
panels are better equipped to determine such 
complex issues.
For litigants, certainly, the choice has been clear. 
Many disputes
that originally may have concluded with a trial 
now conclude in arbi-
tration. Litigants value the autonomy in selecting 
an expert adjudica-
tor familiar with its industry and practice who can 
deliver a disposition
in a cost-efficient way. But this may come at the 
detriment to society
at large; this is an admittedly nebulous claim, but 
it is one that evokes
questions: Does it matter that arbitrators may 
reach different conclu-
sions on similar sets of facts? Does it matter that 
litigants can consent
to what law will and will not apply? Does it matter 
that arbitrators are
233 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n 
v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855-56 (not-
ing that Congress's assignment of common law 
counterclaims arising out of disputes
before the CFTC sought to "mak[e] effective a specific and 
limited federal regulatory
scheme" and that the CFTC's adjudication of the counterclaims 
was "incidental to,
and completely dependent upon, adjudication of reparations claims 
created by federal
law" (emphasis added)).
234 See e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 
87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2000)
(involving highly technical antitrust action over Microsoft's attempts 
to monopolize,
tying of its internet browser to its operating 
system, and anticompetitive behavior
toward rival firms), affd in part and rev 'd in part, 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001); Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-81 (Del. 1985) (involving 
landmark business judg-
ment rule case finding that a company's board 
of directors had not considered the
appropriate value of the company's "true value" 
in accepting an offer for sale,
prompting an outcry not only from directors, officers, 
and insurance companies, but
from the Delaware legislature as well); see also DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b) (7)
(2001) (permitting companies to immunize director action 
in duty of care cases);
Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in the New Economy 
2-8 (U. Chi. Law & Econ., John M.
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 106, 2000), available 
at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=249 3 16 (questioning whether traditional antitrust 
enforcement is appropri-
ate to respond to developments in today's economy).
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neither bound by nor create precedent? And does 
it matter that these
arbitrations, hidden from public view, strip the 
legal system of its
opportunity to develop its norms and standards?
Employing experts in administrative adjudications provides 
an
answer to these questions and a solution to the 
dilemma facing the
American legal system. Although some may protest 
the very constitu-
tional basis upon which the administrative state 
is built, most would
agree that it is here to stay. The jurisprudence of even the 
strictest of
separation-of-powers originalists on the Supreme 
Court-with the
exception, maybe, of Justice Thomas235
- hasn't challenged the consti-
tutionality of administrative agencies. And although 
some may pro-
test the extra-judicial methods that administrative courts employ, 
most
would agree that the efficiency advantages that 
the agencies' disinter-
ested experts offer exceeds anything that can be 
found in the federal
court system.
I don't suggest that administrative agencies are 
the only solution
to the expanse separating public from private adjudication. I 
suggest
only that administrative agencies and their adjudicatory mechanisms
lend themselves to the sort of complex technicalities 
that characterize
cases today and that have precipitated the schism 
between private and
public law.
235 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 
457, 487 (2001) (commenting that
he would "be willing to address the question whether 
[the] delegation jurisprudence
has strayed too far from [the] Founders' understanding 
of separation of powers).
1648 NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW 
[VOL. 82:4
